Editorial by Olsen, Karen Holm et al.
  
 
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? 
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Aug 08, 2016
Editorial
Olsen, Karen Holm; Fenhann, Jørgen Villy; Lütken, Søren
Published in:
Elements of a New Climate Agreement by 2015
Publication date:
2013
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
Citation (APA):
Olsen, K. H., Fenhann, J. V., & Lütken, S. (2013). Editorial. In Elements of a New Climate Agreement by 2015.
(pp. 5-7). Risø National Laboratory, UNEP Risø Centre.  (Perspectives Series).
T his year’s Perspectives from UNEP and its UNEP Risø Centre in collaboration with the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) focuses on the elements of a new climate agreement by 2015 that will contribute to achieve the 2°C limit for global warming. The first paper frames the global mitigation challenge based on the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2012. The five other articles address key elements of a new climate agreement; emissions from international aviation, a vision for carbon markets up to 2020 and beyond, how green growth strategies can address the emissions gap, redesign of a REDD+ mechanism in response to the crisis of global deforestation and how NAMAs in Southern Africa can reconcile the gap between local and global objectives for development and climate change mitigation.  The Perspectives series seeks to inspire policy- and decision  makers by communicating the diverse insights and visions  of leading actors in the arena of low carbon development  in developing countries.
PersPectives  series  2013
Elements of a New  Climate Agreement by 2015
Elements of a New Climate Agreement by 2015
PersPec
tives series     2013
PersPectives  series  2013
Elements of a New  Climate Agreement by 2015 
Karen Holm Olsen Jørgen Fenhannsøren Lütken
Elements of a New  Climate Agreement by 2015
June 2013UNEP Risø Centre,Department of Management EngineeringTechnical University of DenmarkP.O. Box 49DK-4000 RoskildeDenmark
Tel: +45 46 77 51 29Fax: +45 46 32 19 99www.uneprisoe.orgwww.cd4cdm.org
ISBN: 978-87-92706-08-9Graphic design:KowskyPrinted by:Frederiksberg Bogtryk A/S, DenmarkPrinted on environmentally friendly paper
Disclaimer
The findings, opinions, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the UNEP Risø Centre, the United Nations Environment Program, the Technical University of Denmark, The Global Green Growth Institute, nor to the respective organizations of each individual author.
Vandret placering
min. størrelse
Lodret placering
min. størrelse
CO2 neutralized print
Frederiksberg Bogtrykkeri A/S has neutralized 
the CO2 emissions through the production of 
this publication.
Contents
Foreword 4Howard Bamsey and John Christensen
editorial 5Karen Holm Olsen, Jørgen Fenhann and Søren Lütken
tHe gLObaL  mit igatiOn cHaLLengethe gap between the Pledges and emissions needed for 2°c 9Niklas Höhne and Michel den Elzen
Key eLements OF  a  new agreementbridging the Political barriers in negotiating a global market- based measure for controlling international aviation emissions 21Mark Lutes and Shaun Vorster
the role of market mechanisms in a Post-2020  climate change agreement 35Andrei Marcu
addressing the emissions gap through green growth 53Inhee Chung, Dyana Mardon and Myung Kyoon Lee
Harmonization and Prompt start:  the Keys to achieving scale and effectiveness with reDD+  67Christian del Valle, Richard M. Saines and Marisa Martin
implementing namas Under a new climate agreement  that supports Development in southern africa  83Norbert Nziramasanga
FOrewOrD
A new global climate agreement by 2015 is cru-cial to keep global warming below the target of maximum 2 degree increase in this century. This will require enhanced ambitions by all Parties and need transformational change towards sustaina-ble, low carbon development and green growth. Scenarios consistent with a likely chance to meet the 2 degree target have a peak of global emis-sions before 2020. Green growth and low-car-bon development strategies show that economic growth and environmental sustainability are com-patible objectives by making emission reductions an integral part of national development plans.
Since 2010, UNEP has published a series of re-ports on the ‘emissions gap’ in 2020 between emission levels consistent with the 2°C target and emission levels projected, if countries fulfill their emission reduction pledges made in the Copen-hagen Accord and Cancún Agreements. The gap in 2012 for a likely chance to meet the 2°C target is in the range of 8-13 GtCO2, which is higher than the assessment in 2011 and indicates that global emissions are increasing, which is not in line with the aim of the Convention to stabilize the global climate and avoid dangerous climate change. 
The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and its UNEP Risø Centre have in co-operation with the Global Green Growth Insti-tute (GGGI) prepared the Perspectives 2013 to respond to this global challenge. The publication focuses on how elements of a new climate agree-ment can contribute to close the ‘emissions gap’. Six articles have been invited to address crucial aspects of a possible new agreement; 1) framing of the global mitigation challenge, 2) how to limit emissions from international aviation, 3) a vision for the role of the carbon market to 2020 and beyond, 4) how green growth strategies can con-tribute to close the emissions gap, 5) how REDD+ can be designed in response to the crisis of global deforestation and 6) how Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) can be implemented with the example of Southern Africa to reconcile the gap between global mitigation objectives and local development priorities.
With Perspectives 2013 the GGGI and the UNEP Risø Centre aim to inspire policy- and decision makers to develop the elements of new climate agreement that will meet the 2°C target. 
John ChristensenDirectorUNEP Risø Centre
Howard BamseyDirector-GeneralGGGI
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5At COP 17 in Durban, the Parties agreed to de-velop a new global climate agreement to be con-cluded in 2015 and to come into effect by 2020. Its legal form has not yet been decided. It may be a protocol or another legal instrument, or it may be an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties. At COP 18 in Doha, the Parties agreed that they will consider elements for a draft negotiation text no later than 2014, with a view to making it available before May 2015 and to finalize the agreement at COP 21 in Paris in 2015.
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Plat-form for Enhanced Action (ADP) is negotiating this new climate agreement in two work streams. Work Stream 1 relates to the new agreement to be concluded by 2015, and Work Stream 2 relates to the pre-2020 ambition to keep global warm-ing below 1.5 – 2.0°C. The new agreement must contain national, legally binding targets and ac-tions on mitigation and adaptation supported by finance, technology and capacity development to achieve the goal within an overall framework of ambition, accountability and equity.
This year’s Perspectives aims to explore impor-tant elements of a new agreement with a focus on how to close the ambition gap and ensure the global mitigation effort. Dividing lines in the negotiations have emerged between groups of developed and developing countries over the issues of the differentiation of commitments and the interpretation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBD&RC). Developed countries ar-gue that responsibilities and capabilities evolve over time and that the binary system of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 is outdated. A new agree-ment should be based on a dynamic framework, including commitments for all major economies to follow a flexible, scheduled approach and to take into account changing economic realities and national circumstances. Most developing countries are opposed to a re-interpretation of the CBD&RC principle, including a rewriting of its annexes, and stress the historical responsibil-ity of developed countries for global warming. A new agreement must be based on the principles of the Convention, including its annexes, and there should be no negotiation of a new regime. 
eDitOriaL
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6The five other articles address key elements of a new agreement.
Mark Lutes and Shaun Vorster address the problem of emissions from aircrafts. This sector can make an important contribution to closing the giga-tonne emissions gap. The article provides back-ground to the current state of the negotiations for a global multilateral agreement on market-based measures and presents options for an enhanced interpretation of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CB-DR&RC) that could contribute to overcoming the longstanding deadlock. These options emerged from a multi-stakeholder process convened by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and are to be discussed by the International Civil Aviation Or-ganization (ICAO) at their Assemblies meeting in 2013. This will be their chance to make progress on this fast growing sector in the pre-2020 pe-riod, including by putting a price on emissions from aircraft.
Andrei Marcu points out that markets that are well regulated and have clear objectives have a critical role to play in making a new climate change agree-ment possible. The article starts by outlining the state of play in international negotiations and in the carbon market, including lessons learned from ten years of operating a carbon market. It then provides a series of assumptions on the fu-ture architecture of a post-2020 climate change agreement, as well as a vision of the carbon mar-ket to 2020 and beyond. Finally, it answers two key questions. Does the carbon market have a role to play in a post-2020 agreement, and what is the role of a post-2020 agreement in the creation and operation of a carbon market?
Inhee Chung, Dyana Mardon and Myung Kyon Lee aim to identify how implementing Green Growth at the national level can bridge the emission gap 
While this year’s Perspectives cannot solve the conflicts, a common aim of the papers is to offer recommendations to policy- and decision-makers on how to close the mitigation gap by addressing specific elements of an agreement. Tensions are high among negotiators, and positioning among the Parties to agree on a common solution to global warming seems to have evolved little over the past twenty years. It is appropriate, howev-er, to stress that the situation has changed over the years. Not only has climate science painted a much grimmer picture of the consequences we are imminently facing, but global emissions have also increased significantly and are not in line with the aim of the convention to achieve stabili-zation and avoid dangerous climate change. Thus, in the context of on-going negotiations, the six articles in this year’s Perspectives cover some of the important elements of a new global climate agreement. 
The first paper frames the global mitigation chal-lenge. 
Niklas Höhne and Michel den Elzen describe the gap between expected emissions in 2020 according to country pledges and emissions consistent with the 2°C target, assuming the emission reduction pledges in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agreements are met. This is based on the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2012, updated with deci-sions taken in late 2012. The estimated emissions gap in 2020 is 8 to 12 GtCO2e, depending on how emission reduction pledges are implemented. The emissions gap could be narrowed through imple-menting the more stringent, conditional pledges, minimising the use of ‘lenient’ credits from for-ests and surplus emission units, avoiding dou-ble-counting of offsets and implementing meas-ures beyond current pledges. Closing the gap will become more difficult the more time passes.
7by addressing the political, financial, capacity and governance challenges faced especially by developing and emerging economies. The article investigates how green growth can address the emission gap in general and considers the exam-ples of Ethiopia, Cambodia, and the United Arab Emirates. In all three cases, there is high level of political commitment to ensure the integration of emissions-reducing mechanisms into develop-ment plans. Economic growth and environmen-tal sustainability are seen as mutually compatible objectives rather than opposing forces, with the understanding that preserving the sustainability of natural resources will yield significant benefits without sacrificing economic prosperity.
Christian del Valle, Richard M. Saines and Marisa Martin recommend that the new global climate agreement should: 1) design the REDD+ pro-gramme to include a financing approach that will attract scaled, sustained private participation in order to attract the requisite level of financing, given the shrinking capacity of governments to fund REDD+ activities alone; 2) collaborate with non-UNFCCC actors in the development of sys-tem-wide, credible and transparent monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), as well as en-vironmental and social safeguards for REDD+ activities, and to encourage the adoption of sim-ilar standards at all jurisdictional levels; and 3) encourage REDD+ investment now, in advance of 2020, by establishing a formal prompt-start pro-gramme for credible REDD+ activities. 
Norbert Nziramasanga suggests ways to define and implement National Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) in southern Africa using a less burdensome approach that ensures accelerat-ed migration to cleaner technologies whilst ac-commodating a region with a limited capacity to monitor and evaluate small and diffuse projects. The article reviews the development priorities of 
southern Africa and shows how climate change mitigation initiatives have so far failed to meet development objectives. The gap between local and global objectives is mostly due to technical project appraisal approaches that miss out on the opportunities to integrate climate change mitiga-tion and development. 
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9 abstractThis chapter describes the gap between expected emissions in 2020 according to country pledges and the emissions consistent with the 2°C target, assuming the emission reduction proposals in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agreements are met. It is based on the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2012 updated with decisions taken late 2012. The estimated emissions gap in 2020 for a “likely” chance of being on track to stay below the 2°C tar-get is 8 to 12 GtCO2e (depending on how emission reduction pledges are implemented). This emissions gap has become larger compared to the previous UNEP assessment, because of higher than expect-ed economic growth and the inclusion of “double counting” of emission offsets in the calculations. The emissions gap could be narrowed through im-plementing the more stringent, conditional pledges, minimising the use of “lenient” credits from forests and surplus emission units, avoiding double-count-ing of offsets and implementing measures beyond current pledges. Closing the gap will increasingly become more difficult with more time passing. 
introduction
In December 2010 at the annual conference of Parties (COP) under the United Nations Frame-work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancún, Mexico, the international community agreed that further mitigation action is necessary. The conference “recognizes that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science, and as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and that Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent with science and on the basis of equity; Also recognizes the need to consider, in the con-text of the first review […] strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C” (UNFCCC, 2010).
Already one year earlier, the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009) referred to a 2°C tar-get and encouraged countries to submit their 
The Gap Between the Pledges  and Emissions Needed for 2°C 
Michel den ElzenPBL Netherlands  Environmental  Assessment Agency 
Niklas HöhneEcofysEnvironmental Systems Analysis Group, Wageningen University
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emission reduction proposals and actions for the year 2020. Following that conference, forty-two industrialized countries submitted quantified economy-wide emission targets for 2020. In ad-dition, forty-five developing countries submitted so-called nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for inclusion in the Appendices to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. These pledges were 
later ‘anchored’ in the 2010 Cancún Agreement (UNFCCC, 2011a, b), and have since become the basis for analysing the extent to which the global community is on track to meet long-term temper-ature goals. 
In the preparation of the Cancún conference the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), together with the European Climate Foundation and the National Institute of Ecology (Mexico), presented the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2010) that summarises the scientific findings of recent individual studies on the size of the “gap” between the pledged emissions and the levels consistent with the 2°C climate target. This 2010 report has been followed by the UNEP Bridging the Gap Re-port (UNEP, 2011), and the latest UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2012 (UNEP, 2012a). 
This chapter briefly describes an overview of the emissions gap based on the latest UNEP report, updated taking into account decisions agreed at Doha in December 2012.
Pathways towards the 2°c target
Least-cost emission scenarios consistent with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target have a peak before 2020, and have emission levels in 2020 of about 44 GtCO2e (range: 41-47 GtCO2e) (UNEP 2012a), which is based on the methodol-ogy described in Rogelj et al. (2011). Afterwards, global emissions steeply decline (a median of 2.5% per year, with a range of 2.0 to 3.0% per year). Forty percent of the assessed scenarios with a “likely” chance to meet the 2°C target have net negative total greenhouse gas emissions before the end of the century 2100. Accepting a “medi-um” (50-66%) rather than “likely” chance of stay-ing below the 2°C target relaxes the constraints on emission levels slightly, but global emissions still peak before 2020.
The few scenarios available for a 1.5°C target (Ranger et al., 2012; Rogelj et al., 2013; Schaef-fer and Hare, 2009) indicate that scenarios con-sistent with a “medium” chance of meeting the 1.5°C limit have average emission levels in 2020 of around 43 GtCO2e (due to the limited number of studies no range was calculated), and are fol-lowed by very rapid rates of global emission re-duction, amounting to 3% per year (range 2.1 to 3.4%). Some studies also find that some overshoot of the 1.5°C target over the course of the century is inevitable.
Based on a limited number of studies (e.g., OECD, 2012; Rogelj et al., 2012; van Vliet et al., 2012), it is expected that scenarios with higher global emissions in 2020 are likely to have higher medi-um- and long-term mitigation costs, and – more importantly – pose serious risks of not being fea-sible in practice.
Least-cost emission scenarios consistent with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target have a peak before 2020
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The estimates of the emissions gap in the UNEP gap reports so far were based on least cost sce-narios which depict the trend in global emissions up to 2100 under the assumption that climate targets are met by the cheapest combination of policies, measures and technologies considered in a particular model. There are now a few pub-lished studies on later action scenarios that have taken a different approach. These scenarios also seek to limit greenhouse gas emissions to levels consistent with 2°C, but assume less short-term mitigation and thus higher emissions in the near term. Because of the small number of studies along these lines, the question about the costs and risks of these later action scenarios cannot be conclusively quantified right now.
That being said, it is clear that later action will imply lower near-term mitigation costs. But the increased lock-in of carbon-intensive technolo-gies will lead to significantly higher mitigation costs over the medium- and long-term. In addi-tion, later action will lead to more climate change with greater and more costly impacts, and higher emission levels will eventually have to be brought down by society at a price likely to be higher than current mitigation costs per tonne of greenhouse gas.
Moreover, later action will have a higher risk of failure. For example, later action scenarios are likely to require even higher levels of “net nega-tive emissions” to stay within the 2°C target, and less flexibility for policy makers in choosing tech-nological options. Later action could also require much higher rates of energy efficiency improve-ment after 2020 than have ever been realised so far, not only in industrialized countries but also in developing countries.
the emissions gap
Global greenhouse gas emissions are estimated to be 58 GtCO2e (range 57 to 60 GtCO2e) in 2020 under business-as-usual (BAU) conditions, which is about 2 GtCO2e higher than the BAU estimated in the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2011). BAU emissions were derived based on esti-mates from seven modelling groups1 that have an-alysed a selection of emission reduction propos-als by countries and have updated their analysis since 2010. This data set is used in the remainder of this chapter. 
Since November 2010, no major economy has sig-nificantly changed its emission reduction pledge under the UNFCCC. Some countries have clari-fied their assumptions and specified the methods by which they would like emissions accounted for. For example, Australia has provided its interpre-tation on how to account for its base year un-der the Kyoto Protocol and Brazil has provided a new estimate for its BAU emissions, to which its pledge is to be applied. Belarus expressed their 2020 target as a single 8% reduction compared to 1990 levels rather than the range 5-10%, and Kazakhstan changed their reference year from 
1  The modelling groups are: Climate Action Tracker by Ecofys (Cli-mate Action Tracker, 2010); Climate Analytics and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, PIK, www.climateactiontracker.org; Climate Inter-active (C-ROADS), www.climateinteractive.org/scoreboard; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), http://www.feem.it/; Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics; OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD, 2012); PBL Netherlands (den Elzen et al., 2012b) and UNEP Risoe Centre (UNEP, 2012b).
But the increased lock-in of carbon-intensive technologies will lead to significantly higher mitigation costs over the medium- and long-term
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1992 to 1990. South Africa and Mexico included a range instead of a fixed value for their BAU in 2020, which changes their BAU-related pledg-es. South Korea updated their BAU emissions in 2020 downwards, which reduces estimated emis-sion levels after implementing its pledge. These changes may be significant for the countries in question but are minor at the global level (in ag-gregate, they are smaller than 1 GtCO2e in 2020).
The projection of global emissions in 2020 as a result of the pledges depends on whether the pledges are actually implemented and on the ac-counting rules used for the implementation of these pledges:
•  A “conditional” pledge depends on factors such as the ability of a national legislature to enact necessary laws, action from other countries, or the provision of finance or technical support. Some countries did not attach conditions to their pledge, described here as an “uncondi-tional” pledge.
•  International rules on how emission reductions are to be measured after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol have not yet been defined. Accounting rules for emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LU-LUCF) for Annex I countries have been agreed at the COP conference in Durban (2011) for a second commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Grassi et al., 2012; UNFCCC, 2012a). However, accounting rules for emissions from developed countries that are not participating in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. USA and perhaps Russia, Japan, Canada), as well as rules for non-Annex I coun-tries, have not been agreed upon.
•  In addition, rules have been agreed for using surplus emissions credits, which will occur when countries’ actual emissions are below their emission reduction targets of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, at the COP conference in Doha (2012) (Kollmuss, 2013; UNFCCC, 2012b). More specifically, al-lowances not used in the first commitment peri-od can be carried over to the next commitment period, but the recent decisions significantly limit the use of such surplus allowances and prevent build-up of new ones. Countries partic-ipating in the second commitment period can sell their surplus allowances. This will exclude Russia, which is the largest holder of surplus allowances, but will not participate in the sec-ond commitment period. Buyer countries can only purchase up to 2% of their own initial as-signed amount for the first commitment period. In addition, a number of countries – Australia, the EU, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland – have signed a declaration that they will not purchase these units. Finally, new surplus allowances are prevented by the fact that targets for 2020 may not be above the country’s 2008-2010 emissions average, which affects Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, who proposed target emission levels in their pledges above that average.
•  Finally, there is potential “double counting”, where emission reductions in developing coun-tries that are supported by developed countries through offsets (for example, using the Clean 
Since November 2010, no major economy has significantly changed its emission reduction pledge under the UNFCCC
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Development Mechanism) are counted towards meeting the pledges of both countries. These reductions occur only once and should be ac-counted for only towards the developed for the developing country, not to both. Rules on how to treat such potential double counting have not been agreed to, nor have countries agreed to avoid double counting. For example, some countries have stated that emission reductions sold to other jurisdictions will still be consid-ered as meeting their pledge as well.
The UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2012 describes four scenario cases of emissions in 2020, based on whether pledges are conditional, or not; and on whether accounting rules are strict or more lenient (see Figure 1). The gap reports define “strict” rules to mean that allowances from LU-LUCF accounting and surplus emission credits will not be counted towards the emission reduc-tion pledges. Under “lenient” rules, these allow-ances can be counted as part of countries meet-ing their pledges. 
The UNEP Emissions Gap 2012 report estimated the potential contribution of LULUCF account-ing under the new rules as adopted in Durban at 0.3 GtCO2e in the lenient case, assuming that all Annex I countries adopt the new rules, based on one study (Grassi et al., 2012). This assumption is also used here.
The Gap 2012 report used for the impact of the Kyoto surpluses an estimate of 1.8 GtCO2e in the lenient case, to show the maximum impact in 2020 that would occur if all surplus credits were purchased by countries with pledges that do require emission reductions, displacing mit-igation action in those countries. The decision made in Doha on surpluses effectively reduce the maximum impact of surpluses in 2020. Here, we assume a conservative maximum estimate of 0.6 
GtCO2e, which is based on the impact of only do-mestic use of Kyoto surpluses under the condi-tional pledge case, as analysed by den Elzen et al. (2012a). This estimate is used in the calculations of the pledges presented below, and leads to low-er global emission estimates for the lenient cases compared to the UNEP Gap 2012 report. Similar as in the UNEP 2012 report, we further assume no new surpluses, i.e. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Be-larus follow BAU emissions, and do not sell their Kyoto surpluses, as there is no demand. 
Finally, double counting of reductions increases the upper limit of pledged emissions in the leni-ent case compared to the 2011 UNEP gap report by additional 0.75 GtCO2e. This is calculated roughly by simply assuming that international emissions offsets could account for 33% of the difference between BAU and pledged emission levels by 2020 for all Annex I countries excluding the US and Canada, which have indicated only to make very limited use of offset credits. In addition, there is a risk of 0.15 GtCO2e that more offset credits are generated than emissions are actually reduced. 
This leads to the following results:
case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules” If countries implement their lower-ambition pledg-es and are subject to “lenient” accounting rules, then the median estimate of annual greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 is 56 GtCO2e, within a range of 55-56 GtCO2e.
Rules on how to treat such potential double counting have not been agreed to, nor have countries agreed to avoid double counting
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Figure 1. Summary of the gaps that result from four different interpretations of how the pledges are followed, and for a “likely” (greater than 66%) and a “medium” (50-66%) chance of staying below 2°C.
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case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules” This case occurs if countries keep to their low-er-ambition pledges, but are subject to “strict” ac-counting rules. In this case, the median estimate of emissions in 2020 is 54 GtCO2e, within a range of 54-55 GtCO2e. 
case 3 – “conditional pledges, lenient rules” Some countries offered to be more ambitious with their pledges, but linked that to various condi-tions described previously. If the more ambitious conditional pledges are taken into account, but accounting rules are “lenient”, median estimates of emissions in 2020 are 53 GtCO2e within a range of 52-54 GtCO2e. 
case 4 – “conditional pledges, strict rules” If countries adopt higher-ambition pledges and are also subject to “strict” accounting rules, the me-dian estimate of emissions in 2020 is 52 GtCO2e, within a range of 51-52 GtCO2e.
For Annex I countries, in the least ambitious case (“unconditional pledges, lenient rules”), emis-sions are estimated to be between 5 per cent be-low 1990 levels and 5 per cent above 1990 levels or equivalent to business-as-usual emissions in 2020. In the most ambitious case, Annex I emis-sions in 2020 are expected to be 15-18 per cent below 1990 levels. For non-Annex I countries, in the less ambitious cases emissions are estimated to be 4-10 per cent lower than business-as-usual emissions, in the ambitious cases 7-13 per cent lower than business-as-usual. This implies that the aggregate Annex I countries’ emission goals fall short of reaching the 25-40 per cent reduc-tion by 2020 (compared with 1990) suggested in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Gupta et al., 2007). Similarly, the non-Annex I countries’ goals, collectively, fall short of reaching the 15-30 per cent deviation from business-as-usual which is also commonly used as a benchmark (den Elzen 
and Höhne, 2008, 2010). Whilst these values are helpful as a benchmark, they have to be regularly updated with the latest knowledge.
The estimated emissions gap in 2020 for a “likely” chance of being on track to stay below the 2oC target is 8 to 12 GtCO2e (depending on how emis-sion reduction pledges are implemented), as com-pared to 6 to 11 GtCO2e in last years’ Bridging the Emissions Gap Report. The gap is larger because of higher than expected economic growth and the inclusion of “double counting” of emission offsets in the calculations.
The assessment clearly shows that country pledg-es, if fully implemented, will help reduce emis-sions to below the BAU level in 2020, but not to a level consistent with the agreed upon 2°C target, and therefore will lead to a considerable “emis-sions gap”. As a reference point, the emissions gap in 2020 between BAU emissions and emissions with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target is 14 GtCO2e. As in previous reports, four cases are considered which combine assumptions about 
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pledges (unconditional or conditional) and rules for complying with pledges (lenient or strict).
•  Under Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, leni-ent rules”, the gap would be about 12 GtCO2e (range: 9-15 GtCO2e). Projected emissions are about 2 GtCO2e lower than the busi-ness-as-usual level.
•  Under Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”, the gap would be about 10 GtCO2e (range: 7-14 GtCO2e). Projected emissions are about 4 GtCO2e lower than the busi-ness-as-usual level.
•  Under Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”, the gap would be about 9 GtCO2e (range: 5-13 GtCO2e). Projected emissions are about 5 GtCO2e lower than the business-as-usual level.
•  Under Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”, the gap would be about 8 GtCO2e (range: 4-11 GtCO2e). Projected emissions are about 6 GtCO2e lower than the business-as-usual level.
There is increasing uncertainty that conditions currently attached to the high end of country pledges will be met and in addition there is some doubt that governments may agree to stringent international accounting rules for pledges. It is therefore more probable than not that the gap in 2020 will be at the high end of the 8 to 12 Gt-
CO2e range. On the positive side, fully implement-ing the conditional pledges and applying strict rules brings emissions more than 40% of the way from BAU to the 2°C target.
Options to increase the 2020 ambition
Several options are available to increase the am-bition level of greenhouse gas reductions until 2020:
•  minimise the use of lenient land use credits and surplus emission units and impact of double counting (1-2 gtcO2e): If industrialized coun-tries applied strict accounting rules to mini-mise the use of “lenient LULUCF credits” and avoided the use of surplus emissions units for meeting their targets, they would strengthen the effect of their pledges and thus reduce the emissions gap in 2020 by about 1 to 2 GtCO2e (with up to 0.3 GtCO2e coming from LULUCF accounting and up to 0.6 GtCO2e from surplus emissions units). Double counting of offsets could lead to an increase of the gap of up to 0.75 GtCO2e, depending on whether countries implement their unconditional or conditional pledges. 
•  implement the more ambitious conditional pledges (2-3 gtcO2e): If all countries were to move to their conditional pledges, it would significantly narrow the 2020 emissions gap to-wards 2°C. The gap would be reduced by about 2 to 3 GtCO2e, with most of the emission re-ductions coming from industrialized countries and a smaller, but important, share coming from developing countries. This would require that conditions on those pledges be fulfilled. These conditions include expected actions of other countries as well as the provision of adequate financing, technology transfer and capacity building. Alternatively it would imply 
Rules on how to treat such potential double counting have not been agreed to, nor have countries agreed to avoid double counting
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that conditions for some countries are relaxed or removed.
•  implement measures that go beyond current pledges and/or strengthen pledges (potential-ly closing the gap): Mitigation scenarios from modelling studies indicate that it is technically possible to reduce emissions beyond present national plans in 2020 (UNEP, 2011). These scenarios show that the gap could be closed, and that emission levels consistent with 2°C could be achieved through the implementa-tion of a wide portfolio of mitigation measures, including energy efficiency and conservation, renewables, nuclear, carbon capture and stor-age, non-CO2 emissions mitigation, reducing international aviation and maritime emissions, hydro-electric power, afforestation and avoided deforestation. Additional international climate finance could induce additional reductions. As an example, if Annex I countries would reduce their emissions by 25% below 1990 in 2020, it would decrease the gap by an additional 1.6 GtCO2e beyond the strict conditional case. At 40% below 1990 it would be 4.5 GtCO2e. 
conclusions 
We have seen that a global emissions gap is like-ly between expected emissions as a result of the pledges and emission levels consistent with put-ting the world on an cost-effective trajectory in 2020 to avoid expected global warming above the 2°C target. Our calculated scenarios for emissions in 2020 result in emissions of 52 to 56 GtCO2e (median) and therefore leave a gap of 8 to 12 GtCO2e (depending on how emission reduction pledges are implemented) to what would be nec-essary to be on a credible least-cost effective path towards 2°C with a likely chance. This emissions gap has become larger in compared to the pre-vious 2011 UNEP assessment, because of higher 
than expected economic growth and the inclusion of “double counting” of emission offsets in the calculations. Some groups calculated that in the least ambitious case, no reductions beyond busi-ness-as-usual would be required from the group of Annex I countries to meet their targets. 
But our analysis of options for implementing the reduction proposals has also shown that the gap could be narrowed if not closed through several policy options: by increasing current national re-duction pledges to their higher end of their range, by bringing more ambitious pledges to the table, and by adopting strict rules of accounting.
In any case, we now need to lay the groundwork for faster emission reduction rates after 2020: Emis-sion pathways consistent with a 2°C temperature target are characterized by rapid rates of emission reduction post 2020. Such high reduction rates on a sustained time-scale would be challenging and unprecedented historically. Therefore it is critical to lay the groundwork now for faster post 2020 emission reductions, for example, by avoid-ing lock-in of high-carbon infrastructure with long lifespan, or by developing and demonstrating advanced clean technologies. Closing the gap will become more difficult with more time passing.
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 abstractThis paper explores key political issues in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) negotiations on market-based measures (MBMs) for controlling international aviation emissions. The focus is the application of the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and re-spective capabilities” (CBDR&RC) in the context of ICAO negotiations. The paper provides background on the current state of the negotiations for a global multilateral agreement on MBMs under ICAO, and presents options for an enhanced interpretation of CBDR&RC that could contribute to overcoming the longstanding deadlock. These options emerged from a multi-stakeholder process convened by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). 
introduction
Discussions on how to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation are cur-rently taking place under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), including nego-tiations on market-based measures (MBMs) that can put a price on carbon emissions from aircraft on international routes. This ongoing debate has raised many political issues. If an agreement is to be reached on a global approach, it is essential that states overcome the longstanding impasse over the apparent conflict between treaty princi-ples. On the one hand, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR&RC) is a fundamental prin-ciple in the Rio Conventions of 1992, and has been central to climate negotiations under the 
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UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). On the other hand, the principle of non-discrimination and uniformity of treatment between air carriers is fundamental to ICAO. 
The authors take the view that CBDR&RC con-tinues to be fundamental to global efforts to avoid dangerous climate change, but that our understanding and application of this principle must evolve. Whereas some developing countries prefer to emphasise the ‘differentiated’ part, and some developed countries prefer to emphasise the ‘common’ part, it should be clear that we are actually dealing with a careful balancing between differentiated responsibility for the past and com-mon responsibility for the future. We also need to recognise that the world has changed in the two decades since the Rio Earth Summit, and, though the principle of CBDR&RC stands, an enhanced interpretation of the content may be required (Müller, 2012). 
As emissions from international aviation are not included in national totals, ICAO has been ad-dressing the issue at a sectoral level, setting aspi-rational goals that do not impose specific obliga-tions on individual states. For this reason, some states at ICAO have argued that the CBDR&RC 
of states are not directly applicable to a sectoral agreement. Others again take the view that the ultimate objective, principles and provisions of 
the UNFCCC are paramount and that a balance should be struck between climate stabilization and sustainable development. Depending on its design, some measures could impose costs on carriers that could affect travel and trade in par-ticular locations. Understanding and addressing such unintended consequences has been a pri-ority for ICAO. 
This policy brief focuses on possible ways to bridge the political divides in the ICAO negotia-tions by offering different possible narratives for an enhanced interpretation of CBDR&RC. Sec-tion 3 elaborates these creative options1 in more detail, while Section 4 considers the vexing ques-tion of creating precedents in ICAO for the UN-FCCC negotiations. But before doing so, Section 2 briefly explains the contextual environment for this policy debate, including the scientific case for action, the industry’s response to date, and a brief history of the ICAO negotiations.
the contextual environment  for the policy debate
the scientific case for action on aviation emissionsThere is broad scientific, economic and political consensus about the urgency of transitioning to an emissions trajectory that will limit the average global temperature increase compared to pre-in-dustrial levels to below 2 degrees Celsius (°C) during this century, thereby avoiding dangerous climate change. Aviation should contribute its fair share to these efforts, and, in particular, to a near-term peak-and-decline emissions trajectory. Unconstrained growth in aviation emissions will 
1  The options presented below are based on ideas that emerged from a multi-stakeholder process convened by WWF. These proposals should not be seen as consensus positions, but rather as ‘straw person’ proposals for further consideration. Although these ideas emerged from a multi-stake-holder brainstorm, the authors take responsibility for the information and views presented in this paper.
The authors take the view that CBDR&RC continues to be fundamental to global efforts to avoid dangerous climate change, but that our understanding and application of this principle must evolve
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not be compatible with 2050 climate stabilisation goals. 
Currently aviation is responsible for only two per cent of global carbon emissions, (when indirect effects are included, aviation could contribute around 4.9% of current total anthropogenic ra-diative forcing). However, the carbon footprint of aviation will increase significantly as it tracks the globalization of trade, the rise of the middle class in emerging markets, rapid urbanization and exponential growth of long haul tourism, to name but a few drivers. Up to 2050, aviation is expected to grow by an average of 4.5 per cent per annum. However, due to potential fuel efficiency gains estimated to be around of 1.5 per cent/an-num, emissions currently increase at a slower rate (i.e. closer to a three per cent compound annual growth rate). Considering that fuel makes up 30 to 35 per cent of airline operating costs, there is a strong bottom-line incentive to reduce emissions through efficiency improvements. However, even with these improvements, global aviation emis-sions by 2050 will have increased three- to four-fold from 2010 levels. Given industry’s targets for 2050, namely a 50% net reduction below 2005 levels2, this leaves a mitigation gap of more than double today’s total aviation emissions, or nearly 1 700 MtCO2/annum, in 2050 (WEF, 2011). 
industry proposals to control aviation emissionsBecause of aviation’s significant contribution to the global economy and local livelihoods, and mindful that the sector’s growing carbon foot-print is unsustainable in the long run, the avia-
2  IATA has committed the airline industry to a peak-plateau-and-decline emissions trajectory, reducing its “net carbon footprint to 50% below what it was in 2005” by 2050. The IATA trajectory provides for two mid-term milestones, namely “to continue to improve fleet fuel efficiency by 1,5% per year until 2020” and to “cap its net carbon emissions while continuing to grow”, i.e. achieve carbon-neutral growth (CNG), from 2020 (ATAG, 2012:18; also see IATA, 2010).
tion industry has committed drastically to step up its efforts to decarbonise aviation. 
In 2007, IATA’s commercial airline members adopted a so-called four-pillar strategy to address climate change. The four pillars are:
i.  Technological improvements: These interven-tions include (i) short-term improvements that enhance existing and new fleet efficiencies (for example retrofitting and production updates); (ii) medium-term innovations (for example new aircraft and engine design efficiencies in the pipeline), and (iii) long-term step chang-es (for example blended-wing design, the de-ployment of super-lightweight materials that emerge from the nanotechnology revolution, radical new technologies and airframe designs, and the drop-in of low-carbon aviation biofu-els).
ii.  Operational improvements: These interven-tions are by and large aimed at fuel savings, and include the spread of best practices for fuel conservation, greater use of fixed elec-trical ground power at airport terminals, 
Unconstrained growth in aviation emissions will not be compatible with 2050 climate stabilisation goals 
Given industry’s targets for 2050,  namely a 50% net reduction below 2005 levels, this leaves a mitigation gap of more than double today’s total aviation emissions, or nearly 1 700 MtCO2/annum, in 2050 (WEF, 2011) 
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centre-of-gravity optimisation, improved take-off and landing procedures (for example single-engine taxiing and the continuous-de-scent approach), and higher load factors (inter alia achieved through yield management).
iii.  Infrastructural improvements: These interven-tions are aimed at removing inefficiencies in the utilisation of airports and airspace, includ-ing the transition to more flexible airspace use, reorganising the airspace, shortening flight routes, and improving airport and ATM infra-structure and technology.
iv.  Economic measures: In IATA’s lexicon, these are positive economic measures as part of a global, sectoral, market-based approach. In theory, MBM’s could include direct offsetting, emissions trading, or other measures that put a price on emissions, such as carbon or bunker fuel levies or taxes. 
Beyond 2030, the aviation industry enters a pe-riod of great uncertainty in respect of ways and means to achieve climate mitigation targets. By all indications, save for radical technological break-throughs, only the gradual replacement of kero-sene jet fuel with lower-carbon second-generation biofuels currently presents a technological solu-tion – but even this option is clouded by uncer-
tainty about feedstock production, its financial viability (given the prevailing subsidisation of ker-osene jet fuels), and environmental sustainability considerations, such as life-cycle emissions and the impact of land-use change. 
Depending on the scale achievable for biofuels drop-in, the creation of a global MBM that allows for off-setting of aviation emissions internally and against other economic sectors would therefore seem intuitively logical, even in the period out to 2030. The aviation supply chain consists of more than just airlines. The various public and private role players in the vertical supply chain often have conflicting interests, for example the oil companies often have different interests than the airframe or engine manufacturers, airlines or airports when it comes to R&D for second-gen-eration low-carbon biofuels. Therefore, given the market failure, an MBM that puts a price on car-bon will also provide a critical price incentive for investment in the development of a second-gen-eration biofuels industry. 
A recent analysis (Lee et al, 2013) of the range of measures proposed to control aviation emissions shows that MBMs will be necessary to meet ICAO and industry targets of carbon neutral growth from 2020, and a 50% reduction against a 2005 baseline by 2050. However, due to the complex aero-political and climate change negotiating dynamics, creating such an MBM is clouded by significant political uncertainty. 
the politics of aviation emissions Negotiations on a global MBM for aviation emis-sions under the ICAO have been at an impasse for nearly 15 years, and because aviation has been treated as a special case in the UN system, in-ternational aviation emissions have for all intents and purposes been excluded from UNFCCC ne-gotiations (see Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol 
Depending on the scale achievable for biofuels drop-in, the creation of a global MBM that allows for off-setting of aviation emissions internally and against other economic sectors would therefore seem intuitively logical, even in the period out to 2030
25Bridging the Political Barriers in Negotiating a Global Market-based Measure for Controlling International Aviation Emissions
in UNFCCC, 1997). In the meantime, unilateral EU action on international aviation emissions for flights that land in the European aerodrome dom-inates the global policy environment, and causes deep divisions within Europe and between Euro-pean governments and long-haul destinations. 
In 2004, the ICAO Committee on Aviation Envi-ronmental Protection rejected “an aviation-spe-cific emissions trading system based on a new legal instrument under ICAO auspices”. They ex-pressed a preference for the inclusion of aviation in existing national and/or regional emissions trading schemes; although, by 2007, this had been caveated with a caution to states against the inclusion of aviation in an ETS without first obtaining the mutual agreement of other states whose carriers would be affected. By 2009, an ICAO high-level meeting on international avi-ation and climate change “noted the scientific view that the increase in global average temper-ature above pre-industrial levels ought not to ex-ceed 2°C” (ICAO, 2010:34), which, in the context of climate change negotiations, represented a meaningful political signal. This led to the agree-ment on aspirational goals at its 37th General Assembly in 20103. However, ICAO’s 190 parties could once again not reach agreement on glob-al burden-sharing, a compliance regime or mar-ket-based mechanism to achieve this objective, although it did commit to exploring the feasibility of a global MBM and developing a framework for national MBMs by 2013, along with a global CO2 standard for new aircraft and a long-term aspira-tional goal for 2050. 
3  At its 37th Assembly in September 2010, ICAO’s members committed to a goal of a two per cent per annum improvement in fuel efficiency up to 2020 (i.e. a hard target); to an aspirational goal of extending this two per cent year-on-year efficiency improvement up to 2050 (i.e. a soft target); to ‘considering’ the objective of carbon-neutral growth beyond 2020, and to developing a framework for MBMs for international aviation emissions (IATA, 2011:28; ICAO, 2010:8)
Despite this incremental progress, ICAO’s slow progress in establishing a multilateral regime to control emissions in this transnational sector is cause for concern. At the most fundamental level, the deadlock centres on the conflict between the ICAO’s principle of equal treatment and the UN-FCCC’s principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’. 
current status of icaO negotiationsDeveloping countries have continuously argued against a global MBM that would treat all car-riers/states equally on the basis of the provisions and principles of the UNFCCC, most notably the principle of CBDR&RC. For developing countries it is about a fair and equitable deal that balances climate stabilization with sustainable growth and development. 
Some developed countries have continuously ad-vanced arguments related to competitive distor-tions as the imperative for a global MBM. They too frame this as a precondition for a fair and equitable deal. 
Despite this incremental progress, ICAO’s slow progress in establishing a multilateral regime to control emissions in this transnational sector is cause for concern. At the most fundamental level, the deadlock centres on the conflict between the ICAO’s principle of equal treatment and the UNFCCC’s principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’
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Both developed and developing countries also fear that a sectoral agreement for transnational aviation could raise expectations regarding the balance of developed and developing country commitments under the UNFCCC. Therefore, in both UN specialized organizations for interna-tional transport, ICAO and the International Mar-itime Organisation (IMO), there is a fundamental collision between the principles of CBDR&RC and equal treatment. 
ICAO has always stressed that its global goals are sector-wide and do not imply any specific obli-gations for individual states. Furthermore, it has sought to reframe the language to decouple it from the UNFCCC, referring instead to the Special Circumstances and Respective Capabilities of De-veloping Countries (SCRCDC). Others try to ad-dress CBDR&RC concerns by referring to no net incidence (NNI) of any revenue-raising measure on developing countries. These are all attempts to offer an enhanced interpretation of CBDR&RC that differ from historically polarised discussions within UNFCCC. Likewise, the 2010 ICAO Reso-lution also introduced a de minimis threshold for contributing to climate action. Under the de min-imis approach, states with less than 1% of traffic (measured using Revenue Ton Kilometers, RTKs) do not have to submit action plans showing how they will contribute to the ICAO goals, while “commercial aircraft operators of States below the 
threshold should qualify for exemption for appli-cation of MBMs that are established on national, regional and global levels”. Many states issued reservations against this clause questioning both the level of the threshold and the implications: only 26 States are above the threshold, exempting many developed countries while including some developing countries. A carrier-based exemption, it is often claimed, also has the potential to cre-ate competitive distortions where carriers from de minimis states compete directly on a given route with non-exempt carriers. As a consequence, the ICAO expert group on an MBM and large parts of the ICAO council no longer support this ex-emption. 
At a multi-stakeholder workshop organized by WWF in October 2012, there was interest in ex-ploring ideas addressing issues of equity and the application of CBDR&RC in the context of a global MBM under ICAO. A CBDR&RC Working Group was created and, over the course of several months and numerous conference calls and email exchanges, the following options were identified as deserving further exploration and elaboration. These are not consensus positions, but illustra-tive options worthwhile to be elaborated as ‘straw person’ proposals. 
“straw person” proposals for an enhanced interpretation of cbDr&rc
There are two broad indicative approaches: dif-ferential treatment of routes and channeling of revenues.
a) DiFFerentiaL ObLigatiOns by rOUte 
Criteria could be established to differentiate be-tween routes, e.g., routes with low levels of activity or emissions that may be particularly vulnerable to increased costs associated with mitigation meas-
Both developed and developing countries also fear that a sectoral agreement for transnational aviation could raise expectations regarding the balance of developed and developing country commitments under the UNFCCC
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ures. This could be achieved using metrics that reflect characteristics of (i) the departing state (for example, the development status measured in GDP or other economic activity criteria, or even in political terms such as LDC or non-Annex-1 – NAI – as per UNFCCC) or (ii) the aviation-spe-cific characteristics of the route. Under the first approach, all routes departing from a state that qualifies for a specific type of differential treat-ment would be subject to the same rule. Under the second approach, strong competitive routes would be included but differentiation would not apply across the board by state, so different routes from a given country could be subject to different treatment (including potentially by exemption).
The two options of differentiation are described in more detail below:
1)  route-based differentiation based on national indicatorsUnder this approach, states would be allocated to one of three categories defined by economic and/or other development criteria (e.g. GDP per capi-ta). For example: the threshold for Tier 3 could be set at a level that included all LDCs; Tier 2 could be broadly representative of other NAI developing countries, with all remaining states being allocat-ed to Tier 1. At the basis of this approach are new categories, or graduation that breaks with the strict AI/NAI distinction in climate negotiations. It should be noted that a binary division as a mat-ter of the legal form of an agreement is distinct from differentiating the commitments and actions contained within such an agreement. That is, an agreement might retain the legal form of catego-ries of developed and developing countries, but apply a range of commitments. Another element of flexibility is timing. This approach to differen-tiation can be used to phase-in obligations, or to differentiate between them:
2)  route-based differentiation based on aviation characteristics of the routeUnder this option, portions of the pool of allow-able emissions would be differentially allocated to routes (e.g., city-pairs or region-pairs) on the basis of growth of aviation traffic on those routes. All routes would be covered from the outset, but flights on fast-growing routes would receive a greater share of the allowance pool than would those on slow-growing routes. This approach would not discriminate among carriers operating on a given route, i.e., those carriers would receive shares of the portion of the allowance pool allo-cated for that route irrespective of the national-ity of the carrier. This approach also would not discriminate on the basis of state. However, since as a practical matter, traffic on routes between fast-growing developing countries and on routes between fast-growing developing countries and other countries is likely to increase more than traffic on routes between mature markets (prin-cipally in industrialized countries), this option provides a tool for addressing the concerns of some developing countries without breaching the Chicago Convention strictures against discrimi-nation on the basis of country or carrier. It should be noted that the criteria of fast-growing traffic on a given route does not address the special cir-cumstances of LDCs or small island developing states (SIDS), so it is unlikely this approach could be a stand-alone solution for differentiation in a global MBM. 
Aside from the criteria for differentiation, the key question in designing a global MBM is what will be different between routes. Three options are presented below for how different routes could be given different treatment or obligations, ap-propriate to the nature of the respective routes or the countries. It should be noted that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive options – they could be combined in different ways.
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1. Phase-in By way of example, flights between Tier 1 states could be subject to the global measure as soon as it comes into effect. Flights on routes between Tier 3 states will be phased in after 10 years and flights on routes between Tier 2 states will be phased in after 5 years. Routes between tiers will be subject to the rules pertaining to the lowest tier. All car-riers operating on a route will be subject to the same rules irrespective of the nationality of the carrier.
2. Differentiated target levels By way of example, all routes could be covered from the outset but flights between Tier 1 states would be subject to a cap/baseline equivalent to 2005 levels minus 10%, flights on routes between Tier 2 states will be subject to a cap of no net increase in emissions after 2020, while flights on routes between Tier 3 states will be exempt. Routes between tiers will be subject to the rules pertaining to the lowest tier. All carriers operat-ing on a route will be subject to the same rules irrespective of the nationality of the carrier. The thresholds will be fixed to take account of chang-es with time, and a periodic review (e.g., every 5 years) will determine whether states need to be reallocated to a different tier.
3.  Differentiated compliance obligations relative to a common target level Both an offsetting and trading scheme could re-quire the submission of allowances and/or offset credits to meet each entities obligation. Such schemes assume that for each tonne of CO2 emit-ted an allowance or project credit equivalent to one tonne of CO2 must be surrendered. However, to take account of SCRCDC, an emissions factor could be used to either increase or decrease the compliance obligation required. The compliance obligations could be differentiated using the tiered state approach described above. This could 
be implemented as an interim phase-in arrange-ment. If it were a permanent feature, the overall cap may have to be adjusted to ensure overall en-vironmental integrity. Those routes representing states with greater capacity and responsibility, and/or more mature aviation markets, could have a greater compliance obligation, while others could have a lesser compliance obligation. So, on some routes, for example, for each tonne emitted, an entity would be required to surrender 0.5:1 or 0.3:1 allowances or project credits per tonne of emissions. Routes representing states with great-er capability/responsibility could be required to surrender allowances at a ratio greater than 1:1. Such a system should be implemented in a man-ner that maintains the integrity of the emissions cap. Thus: globally, the system must ensure that, on average, each tonne of emissions is matched by at least one tonne of allowances.
b) cHanneLing OF revenUes 
Under this indicative approach all carriers would participate in the global measure and it would ap-ply to all international routes. There could thus be common treatment at operator level. Differentia-tion would then occur during the distribution of revenues, for example to ensure no net incidence on developing countries.
Revenue could be generated through an auc-tion under a global trading system or through a transaction levy on project credits in an offset-ting scheme. In a WWF report undertaken by Viv-id Economics/AET, the amount of revenue that could be generated was estimated at $3.6 billion per annum in 2030 for offsetting and $11.7 billion for an ETS with 50% auctioning (using a global carbon credit price of $25 per tonne of CO2 in 2020, rising to $40 in 2030). A third option may be to impose an emissions levy that would cover all emissions (pricing all emissions and address-
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ing the issuing of allowances that have been dis-tributed freely or emissions under the baseline for offsetting in the other two options). Assuming it was levied at the same price, this option could raise $26.3 billion per annum by 2030. 
There is, however, a huge gap between (i) the no-tion of generating revenues for climate purposes and (ii) overcoming the CBDR&RC issue that lies at the heart of the current impasse in ICAO by ensuring no net incidence on developing coun-ties by differentiating during the distribution of revenues. 
Whereas the notion of revenue use and chan-nelling under the heading of innovative climate finance instruments is not new, there has been strong opposition to generation of revenue in ICAO. To the degree that the notion of revenue is tolerated in aviation circles, there is strong resistance to using it for out of sector purposes. In the relevant negotiations the use of revenues has historically also not been very convincing to developing countries including the most vulner-able countries. The response typically centres on the financing obligations of developed countries, and concerns that global measures could shift the obligations to developing countries. Concerns have also been expressed that there may be un-intended consequences, such as risks to national economies due to sector-wide applied obligations. Therefore, a combination of revenue-raising with a time limited exemption as in option A above might lead to greater political acceptability.
There are different potential ways to collect, ad-minister and differentially distribute the revenue. 
•  Revenue collection would ideally be through a central, multilaterally governed entity on the basis of agreed rules (e.g., Green Climate Fund or another entity identified or created by 
ICAO). It has also been argued that it could be collected by some national governments with clear obligations in terms of the use of the full amount of the funding for climate purposes or to ensure no net incidence on developing countries, but generally we know earmarking at national level is legally complex.
•  Part of the revenue would be channelled to a developing countries (e.g., all non-Annex I countries or a sub-group of non-Annex I such as LDCs and/or SIDS, or countries below a giv-en emissions and/or income threshold) to en-sure they are subject to no net incidence. 
•  The remaining funds can be allocated both to in-sector measures, as well as to out-of-sec-tor climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries, according to multilaterally agreed criteria and governance procedures.
An alternative to distribution of financial re-sources directly would be to distribute emissions allowances, with recipients having the right to monetize them. Allowances could be distributed to specific countries – e.g., those in certain po-litical categories such as NAI or those below a certain income and emissions threshold – which would then auction them and generate finance in order to support low carbon development and 
An alternative to distribution of financial resources directly would be to distribute emissions allowances, with recipients having the right to monetize them
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investment in those countries. Allowances could also be channeled to funds, such as the Green Climate Fund, to generate revenue. 
Precedents for unfccc climate negotiations?
One issue that is of concern to many develop-ing countries and developed countries alike, is the potential precedents that an agreement on an MBM for the aviation sector could set for the broader negotiations under the UNFCCC for the post-2020 period. This question is intimately con-nected to the principle of CBDR&RC, because the primary concern is the perceived potential contradiction between global measures under 
the ICAO (and IMO for maritime transport) that generally do not differentiate / distinguish be-tween aircraft, airlines and countries, particularly on particular routes, and the recognition under the UNFCCC that distinctions should be made between different countries based on their com-mon but different responsibilities for causing the problem, including historical responsibilities, and 
respective capabilities in responding to climate change. Developed countries would seemingly want to level the playing field and avoid competi-tive distortions in global aviation markets; whereas developing countries have long been concerned that these inherently international sectors, fol-lowing the principles and customary practices of the ICAO and IMO, would not only lead to un-fair and inequitable outcomes, but could also set unfavorable precedents for the broader UNFCCC negotiations, including for other sectors where, unlike aviation and maritime transport, emissions take place on national territory and can in princi-ple be adequately addressed by domestic policies.
There are some sound legal reasons why measures to address emissions from the international avia-tion sector would not serve as legal precedents for other sectors, or an overarching agreement under the UNFCCC. The ICAO is governed by the Chica-go Convention, and contains specific provisions to address the unique characteristics of the avia-tion sector. These do not apply to other sectors. The Convention states that laws and regulations of member states “shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to nationality”, and one of the objectives of ICAO, set out in the Convention, is to “Avoid discrim-ination between contracting states”. At the same time, the Preamble states that the undersigned governments have agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation “may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity”. The proponents of a Chicago Convention-based deal would argue that these provisions privileging uniform global treat-ment and the unique nature of the international aviation sector create a legal basis for avoiding the use of arrangements for aviation (or shipping) as a direct legal precedent for the climate regime applied to states or to other sectors. Of course this notion is challenged by developing countries that 
Developed countries would seemingly want to level the playing field and avoid competitive distortions in global aviation markets; whereas developing countries have long been concerned that these inherently international sectors, following the principles and customary practices of the ICAO and IMO, would not only lead to unfair and inequitable outcomes, but could also set unfavorable precedents for the broader UNFCCC negotiations
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prefer a deal based on the provisions and princi-ples of the UNFCCC.
The proponents of a sui generis agreement cover-ing international aviation emissions argue:
•  The multilateral process continues to be effec-tive, and the UN system is capable of deliver-ing ambitious, rule-based global outcomes that adequately reflect fairness, equity, sustainable development and the urgent need for action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
•  The UNFCCC is the only legitimate forum for broad multilateral coordination of action on climate change; yet actions in specific sectors or in respect of specific emission sources could also be taking place elsewhere.  Action through other fora and organizations will be essential to stabilise emissions at sustainable levels – for aviation through ICAO. The UNFCCC might request more specialized bodies to undertake specific tasks, and / or such fora could define themselves as making a contribution to the overall effort to tackle climate change. Main-taining an overview of action by many actors at different scales is essential to ensure an ad-equate response. 
•  International transport – aviation and mar-itime transport – are uniquely global sectors that require coordinated international action, and measures to address emissions from these sectors does not prejudge outcomes of negoti-ations in other sectors.
•  There are practical ways of applying the princi-ples of CBDR&RC and Special Circumstances and Respective Capabilities to climate miti-gation measures that ensure fairness, equity, sustainable development and environmental integrity. These enhanced interpretations may 
be appropriate to certain sectors and contexts, and not universally in all contexts.
Potential precedents for which there is likely to be strong opposition from developing countries:
•  Global emissions targets to be set, and meas-ures implemented to address them, without ad-dressing differences in national circumstances and CBDR&RC in the implementation of such measures. (Ultimately, a sustainable develop-ment approach still requires that emissions sta-bilization should allow development to proceed in a sustainable manner; we need to balance climate and development imperatives in a fair and equitable regime.)
•  Deviating from the principles of the UNFCCC.
•  Emissions from other economic sectors or ac-tivities in general (e.g., iron and steel, cement, agriculture, etc.) to be covered by uniform global measures that do not discriminate be-tween countries and market actors.
•  Sectoral approaches as the basis for future global climate agreements under the UNFCCC.
•  Global market based approaches a priori as the primary basis for future global climate agree-ments under the UNFCCC. (Even under ICAO 
International transport – aviation and maritime transport – are uniquely global sectors that require coordinated international action, and measures to address emissions from these sectors does not prejudge outcomes of negotiations in other sectors
32
the entire basket of measures should be consid-ered and the work on non-market based meas-ures must form part of a package deal.)
•  Any transfer of resources from the south to the north, or any approach that has inequitable and unfair distributional impacts.
Potential precedents for which there is likely to be strong opposition from (some) developed coun-tries:
•  Agreeing to CBDR&RC as the basis for bur-den-sharing in controlling aviation emissions.
•  Maintaining the existing AI/NAI political cate-gories without provision for graduation. 
•  Recognition, implicit or otherwise, that the developmental challenges of large emerging economies justifies differential treatment from developed countries, either in terms of regula-tion of airlines or in the use of resources gen-erated by carbon pricing. (Policies adopted for sectoral approaches in general should differen-tiate between the sectors in different countries based on the development conditions of the respective countries.) 
•  Any approach that explicitly recognizes that developing countries have the right to access to planetary resources on an equal per capita basis, or to achieve the development and con-sumption levels of developed countries without decarbonising. 
Concern about setting the latter kinds of prece-dents is perhaps one key factor (but likely not the only) contributing to resistance to agreement on a global MBM for the aviation sector on the part of many countries. But that is only at the tactical level. At the most fundamental level this is about 
fairness, equity and the right to sustainable devel-opment in all three of its dimensions. 
If a way could be found to ensure that an accept-able (to developing and developed countries alike) enhanced interpretation of CBDR&RC specific to international aviation does not set legal or po-litical precedents for the negotiations under the UNFCCC, a major barrier to progress would be removed. A solution in addition to its substantive dimensions could be to explicitly recognize and address the concern about creating precedents in the very unique transnational aviation sector. Solutions found for that sector do not necessar-ily apply to, and should in no way prejudge the broader climate negotiations – whether seen from the perspective of a developed or a developing country.
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abstractMarkets have played an important role over the last ten years, having to a large degree captured the spotlight of the Climate Change (CC) debate. While from a market point of view they have functioned well mechanically, there is now a vigorous debate, driven by the current low prices, as to wheth-er they have contributed to mitigation and adaptation efforts. With negoti-ations for a post-2020 agreement in full swing, a legitimate question is how markets can contribute to the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In parallel, an equally important question, as markets develop regionally and nationally outside the UNFCCC, is the role of the post-2020 agreement in the creation of a global carbon market. This paper points out that markets, if well regulated and with clear objectives, have a critical role to play in making a new climate change agree-ment possible. Equally importantly, if there is an international agreement, then the agreement must contain key elements that will be needed to make a global carbon market possible. 
Andrei MarcuHead of Carbon Market ForumCentre for European Policy  Studies (CEPS)
The Role of Market Mechanisms in a Post-2020 Climate Change Agreement
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background
Since the Montreal Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2005, we have been inexorably moving away from the “orderly” world of the Kyoto Proto-col (KP) to a new climate change regime that is intended to be better adapted to today’s economic and political realities. 
The world has changed in many ways since 1997 when the KP was adopted, and the world has changed along some critical axes. Economically, Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and GDP per capita look quite different (see Tables 1 and 2) now. Similarly, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-sions statistics have also changed (Table 3). Final-
ly, and this something that cannot be quantified, the appetite for global governance, especially for an agreement that has such far-reaching implica-tions as a climate change agreement, has dimin-ished considerably.
A climate change agreement is generally placed in the category of environmental agreements and negotiated by officials from the environmental de-partments of the Parties. In reality, the environ-mental component of a climate change agreement is only the core target that needs to be achieved. Most of the work belongs more in a trade and eco-nomic agreement with a focus on technology, bor-der text measures, leakage, intellectual property rights, finance for mitigation and adaptation, etc.
 table 1: gDP (in billions of PPP UsD)
country gPD 1997 share worldwide gDP (1997), in % gDP 2010 share worldwide gDP (2011), in %
Australia 444.15 1.224 877.22 1.175Brazil 1,125.57 3.012 2,186.54 2.928Chili 133.49 0.368 276.80 0.371China 2,285.33 6.297 10,128.40 13.562Germany 1,914.29 5.275 2,957.38 3.960India 1,251.59 3.449 4,051.36 5.425Indonesia 523.76 1.443 4,051.36 1.385Japan 3,105.05 8.556 4,384.48 5.871Mexico 887.66 2.430 1,569.89 2.100Russia 965.11 2.659 2,237.41 2.996Saudi-Arabia 314.94 0.868 628.93 0.842Singapore 112.40 0.310 293.69 0.390South Africa 263.26 0.725 526.95 0.706UK 1,273.62 3.510 2,223.25 2.977USA 8,332.35 22.961 14,498.93 19.414EU-27 9,124.47 25.143 15,283.06 20.464World 36,246.70 100.000 74,683.81 100.000 Source: IMF World Economic outlook 2012
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Since Rio in 1992, progress on climate change has been slow. Those not deeply involved in the cli-mate change debate could easily divide the efforts to address climate change into two parts. One is the interminable UNFCCC negotiations, punctu-ated by the yearly drama of the COPs, which to the casual observer have not produced any visible progress over the last decade. This may be an un-fair assessment given the complexity and the deep implications of the negotiations, as well as the progress made in starting a new round through the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Plat-form for Enhanced Action (ADP) on a different footing. However, this could easily be a casual assessment.
The second part, and the most visible one, over the last decade has been activity in the carbon market that has put a price on pollution in Annex 1 countries and provided a financial signal for what a ton of reduction may be worth globally for project developers in non-Annex 1 countries. 
In the last decade, markets in general, includ-ing commodity and equity markets, have gone through some traumatic times. The public at large, like some Parties, have always questioned the role of markets, especially in addressing envi-ronmental scarcity. While the performance of the SO2 market in the US has provided a good legacy, the performance of the GHG markets has raised a number of questions about their ability to deliver, 
table 2: gDP per capita (in PPP UsD) 
country gDP per capita (1997) gDP per capita (2010) growth (percentage)
Australia 23,867.08 39,545.16 165.69Brazil 6,872.47 11,314.41 164.63Chili 9,021.85 16,192.75 179.48China 1,848.59 7,553.38 408.60Germany 23,330.32 36,172.68 155.05India 1,291.97 3,403.00 263.40Indonesia 2,628.27 4,352.65 165.61Japan 24,634.41 34,240.98 139.00Mexico 9,386.74 13,977.30 148.90Russia 6,529.82 15,657.16 239.78Saudi Arabia 16,543.75 22,818.04 137.93Singapore 28,622.05 56,708.69 198.13South Africa 6,182.12 10,540.87 170.51UK 21,840.79 35,730.86 163.60USA 30,541.33 4,6811.20 153.27EU-27 19,159.04 30,604.20 159.74
Source: IMF World Economic outlook 2012
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and implicitly their relevance to any post-2020 climate change agreement. 
This paper looks at the relevance of a post-2020 climate change agreement to the creation of a global carbon market. Does it have a role to play at all? What functions can it fulfill, based on the lessons learned over the last ten years, the current state of the world, direction of the carbon market and the possible shape of the agreement itself?
The paper will start by outlining the state of play in international negotiations and in the carbon market, including lessons learned from ten years of operating a carbon market. It will then provide a series of assumptions on the future architec-ture of a post-2020 climate change agreement, as 
well as a vision of the carbon market to 2020 and beyond. Finally, it will answer two key questions. Does the carbon market have a role to play in a post-2020 agreement, and what is the role of a post-2020 agreement in the creation and opera-tion of a carbon market?
state of play in UnFccc negotiations
It is still unclear what role, if any, markets will have in the Agreement currently being negotiat-ed under the ADP. However, the use of markets was very much part of the Bali Road Map (BRM) and was included under the rather complex and all-encompassing heading of “Various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation 
table 3: cO2 emissions per country (in thousands of metric tons) 
country cO2 emissions (1997) cO2 emissions (2009) growth (percentage)Australia 333,624 400,194 19.9536Brazil 300,547 367,147 22.1596Chili 56,171 66,732 18.8015China 3,469,510 7,687,114 221.5619Germany 863,975 734,599 -14.9745India 1,043,940 1,979,425 89.6110Indonesia 278,659 451,782 62.1272Japan 1,201,632 1,101,134 -8.3635Mexico 358,383 446,237 24.5140Russia 1,559,238 1,574,386 0.9715Saudi Arabia 216,239 432,772 100.1360Singapore 69,240 31,896 -53.9341South Africa 371,328 499,016 34.3869UK 553,673 474,579 -14.2853USA 5,501,365 5,299,563 -3.6682EU-27 4,009,329 3,617,579 -9.7710
Source: UN and CDIAC
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actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries”. The title itself reflects the compromise that was necessary to in-clude markets in the BRM.
Since Bali, work under the item that became known in the trade as “Various Approaches” has made little progress in what is a clear lack of de-sire by many Parties to move forward. The reasons vary, but the results speak for themselves. Over the last three COPs, whatever advances were achieved were the result of the final overall agreement in which the “markets” text was inserted involving a take-it–or-leave-it overall Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) text.
The “UNFCCC” text has evolved from COP to COP, from Cancun to Durban to Doha. A certain amount of confusion was introduced through the two terms that have become the buzzwords of this part of the negotiations: “New Market Mech-anisms” and “Framework for Various Approaches”. There is still a lack of clarity as to what is meant by these two terms. For some that lack of clarity is useful as it slows down the process. There is still significant disagreement whether the Parties have agreed to create these two elements, whether their existence is still being negotiated or whether what is being negotiated is the role/function, ar-chitecture and modalities and procedures. Given the outcome of the Durban and Doha COPs, we believe the COP has approved these two compo-nents.
However, it is important to note that there is no area under the ADP negotiations that is currently dedicated to the role of markets, and that further work on markets will be carried out under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). This points to continued ambiv-alence as to the role of markets in a post-2020 climate change agreement.
How the process will bring markets under the ADP is unclear, but the effort should be made sooner rather than later. Markets must become part of the ADP agenda.
state of the carbon market
It must be noted that, over the last ten years, most activity in the carbon market was related to “do-mestic trading” for European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) compliance, with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) contributing to that activity. Some trading of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) under Article 17 of the KP has taken place, but it has not as yet played a major role. In addition, as there was no linking of domestic ETS, circulation of AAUs did not fulfill the role of shadowing units being transferred between different jurisdictions.
Broadly, the period leading to 2020 is expected to behave in a similar way, except that the ele-ments of a new market architecture are starting to emerge.
Most market activity to 2020 is expected to be in the EU ETS, but the Australian system is coming online in 2015, the Californian one is operating, and more are expected to start in Korea, China, 
... there is no area under the ADP negotiations that is currently dedicated to the role of markets, and that further work on markets will be carried out under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
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and other national and maybe sub-national ju-risdictions. 
As such, by 2020 we will see domestic ETS oper-ating within KP Parties, and some outside the KP. We see that Australia and EU are due to be fully linked 1 July 2018, which is likely to trigger the transfer of AAUs between these two jurisdictions to “shadow” the transfer of domestic units and keep KP accounting whole for these two countries as Parties to the KP. As long as AAUs are used as a backstop there is no concern, as both countries de facto guarantee the environmental integrity of their domestic units through the AAUs.
Linking is also taking place between Quebec and California, neither of which is part of the KP, and therefore with no obligations vertically, that is, to a higher-level international treaty. Therefore, they only have to worry about their own domes-tic commitments and can function with mutually recognized units, which they agree are good for compliance with their respective obligations 
At the same time, the desire to link their systems is being expressed more and more by Australia, California, and others. This will raise issues, as a California unit received in Australia by an entity that has domestic obligations could use that unit for domestic compliance. However, Australia will not be able to use a California unit for compli-ance with KP obligations, as this is a unit that the Conference of the Parties, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), does not currently recognize. This would have the im-plication that the Australian Government would have to “make up” that unit through the purchase of an internationally recognized unit.
A strong debate is also emerging whether commit-ments taken by Parties that are not members of the KP under the Cancun agreements can be met 
with units that have not been given any formal recognition by the UNFCCC. This is a political issue that needs to be decided and is current-ly reflected in a footnote in 19/CP.18: “Common tabular format for UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”.
There are serious implications for the final out-come of this decision, as it would raise the issue of whether the body that recognizes or gave cre-dence to the obligation, the COP, has anything to say about how that obligation is met. 
In most jurisdictions, the authority that creates the obligation is the only one to affirm whether that obligation has been met and to decide the units or means whereby to prove that it has been met. In any jurisdiction, “What is Legal Tender”, with which carbon units are often compared, is decided by the respective authorities.
markets under the KP: what was learned
Under the KP architecture, market mechanisms were part of the trio of basic building blocks that defined the agreement: caps, timetables and mechanisms. At the beginning of 2013, after the end of the First Compliance Period, we can reflect on what we learned from the role that markets have played in the KP and in the regional and na-tional markets that were used to meet KP targets, as well as their operation since the prompt start of the CDM in 1998. 
•  All the significant market mechanisms were defined top-down, that is, defined by the CMP, operated under the authority of the CMP, and regulated by bodies whose authority had been delegated to them by the CMP. The only market approaches that were defined bottom-up were in the voluntary area
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•  Market infrastructure was part of KP, and it played a critical role in accounting and compli-ance for the CDM. Participation in mechanisms by the Parties on a voluntary basis was subject to compliance with conditions under the au-thority of the CMP. If a Party did not meet cer-tain conditions, then it could not issue units, nor use units from market mechanisms. This was a very real situation that did affect Parties such as Romania and Ukraine. The Internation-al Transaction Log (ITL) played a critical role in ensuring that units were tracked and there was no double counting.
•  Those who created the obligations for compli-ance had the authority to decide what units could be used for compliance. Compliance ob-ligations for Parties with the KP were set un-der the CMP. All units that could be used for compliance with the KP were issued under the CMP’s authority. That ensured, in a very simple way, that the CMP knew the “environmental val-ue” of each unit used for compliance (1 ton). Through the fact that only CMP approved or issued units could be used for KP compliance, there was recognition that the “environmental value” of a compliance unit can only be set by those who set the constraints. This is a funda-mental issue in any regulatory regime. However, an additional principle also needs to be recog-nized and accepted, namely how that recogni-tion is provided, which is also something that the Regulator (CMP) also has the authority to decide upon. ERUs were issued through T1 and T2 either under international supervision or at the purely domestic level, with little interna-tional intervention by the CMP regulator, the JI Supervisory Board.
•  A number of the controversies that emerged regarding the functioning and contribution of carbon markets to mitigation efforts were 
caused by the discontinuity resulting from the largely uncoordinated objectives and rules of these two market levels. This is in itself a crit-ical issue that needs to be recognized and ad-dressed in the new climate change architecture that will emerge from the ADP.
 •  A few very powerful examples can easily be identified. The so-called “recycle CERs” con-troversy was caused by the fact that, for some EU Economies in Transition Parties, they were a way to use their surplus AAUs resulting from the economic downturn in the post-Communist era (successfully demonized by some stakeholders as “hot air”). Similarly, the debate over the use in the EU ETS of CERs from industrial gas pro-jects caused substantial damage to the KP, the KP mechanisms and the credibility of carbon markets in general. It was inevitable that having one regulator in Bonn (the CDM EB) decree, af-ter a thorough investigation, that they it would continue to issue these credits, while a second regulator and legislative body in Brussels took a strong stance that they were unpalatable, would provide ammunition to those looking for an excuse to attack the whole concept of carbon markets.
•  Process Politicization. The process of running and administering the KP mechanisms has been heavily politicized
•  clear objectives. The CDM was the flagship of the KP market mechanism, but its duality of ob-jectives has led to strong debates on the con-tribution it has made to real reductions, as well as to sustainable development. The lesson that needs to be internalized in what is a pure regu-latory market is that the lack of clarity in objec-tives will damage the credibility of the market, affect the social license to operate, and finally impact on its good market functioning. Exam-
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ples are the dispute over the objectives of the EU ETS, namely compliance within the period cap or long-term de-carbonization. Similarly, when it did not meet the purity tests of some, the Sustainable Development (SD) objective of the CDM has been interpreted as casting a neg-ative light over certain projects and technolo-gies. However, adding the SD conditionality as a market constraint, a concept not quantified, muddies the waters in a way that markets can-not understand. Whatever conditionality is intro-duced, it needs to be clearly spelled out for markets so they can quantify it and operate within it.
•  competition and leakage. The vision of the KP was one of a global price for carbon, which would drive reductions around the world in the most efficient way. However, that was in a “sim-pler” world, divided into Annex 1 and Non-An-nex 1 income countries and emissions. Howev-er, as the world changed and the new economic and emissions realities have taken hold, it be-comes apparent that, while paying for rapid de-velopment was OK, subsidizing competition in globally competitive industries, especially in a time of grave economic crisis, was not accept-able. Carbon leakage is becoming an increasing concern. All these matters need to be account-ed for in any new climate change agreement.
•  stability: acceptance of gHg markets and cc science. Closely connected to the issues of competitiveness and leakage is acceptance of climate change science. The introduction of a carbon price through carbon markets imposes an additional cost on society. Public accept-ance of climate change science is important to markets given their complete regulatory nature and the need for stability. A price of carbon in the economy, with the attached concerns sur-rounding competitiveness, can lead to an un-stable regulatory environment. Investments driven by carbon prices cannot take place in an environment where the price of carbon is “here today, gone tomorrow” due to the political color of the government of the day.
Future of the carbon market
Given that in any post-2020 agreement it is ex-pected that all Parties will contribute to mitiga-tion efforts, it can also be expected that many will have wish to have a domestic carbon market as part of their tool box. Others will want to use carbon units in meeting their obligations, and as such may trade on the carbon market while having a domestic one in place.
The future carbon market is expected to have •  Domestic cap-and-trade systems and/or cred-iting systems. These systems may or may not be linked internationally. Given the lack of liquid-ity in most of these systems, it can be expected that most will end up being linked internation-ally.
•  There is also an expectation that internation-ally (UNFCCC) developed and operated mar-ket mechanisms will emerge. They may only be available for use in certain jurisdictions, based on internationally agreed qualifying criteria (such as CDM for Least Developed Countries, 
The lesson that needs to be internalized in what is a pure regulatory market is that the lack of clarity in objectives will damage the credibility of the market, affect the social license to operate, and finally impact on its good market functioning
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LDC, only). Alternatively they could be used by any Party, but accepted by Parties for use in their jurisdictions at their own discretion. As such, some Parties may only accept CERs origi-nating from LDCs, even if they can be produced by any other Party under UNFCCC.
•  Based on economically rational decisions, all Parties will use the most effective way to meet their obligations. This may not be evident to start with, as what are currently non-Annex 1 developing countries may be reluctant to pur-chase units from developed countries or to al-low them to be used in their jurisdictions. As such, the purchase of EUAs by a developing country to meet a post-2020 obligation may not be the first choice of that country. Will it happen in time?
assumptions for a post-2020 climate change regime
Based on past experience and the current discus-sions under the ADP, the climate change regime that is expected to emerge in 2015 will have many features that will differ from the KP, as well as many elements that will undergo transformation to meet the differences from the time when the KP was negotiated.
In order to discuss the role of markets, the new climate change regime needs to be described. At this stage, this analysis can only be based on a number of assumptions, namely:
1.  There will be an international climate change regime under the authority of the COP.
2.  It will have end-of-period compliance obliga-tions where the units used for compliance will have to be accounted for with the Regulator, the COP.
3.  There will be an end-of-compliance period in-ventory. 
4.  There will be no AAUs. The KP “budget” model where AAUs were allocated is not likely to be part of a post-2020 climate change agreement.
5.  All countries will have to show a concrete con-tribution to addressing climate change, based on the Common But Differentiated Responsibil-ity (CBDR) principle. Some countries will have economy-wide caps or targets. They could be developed countries, or developing countries that choose to present their efforts in this way. At the same time, such commitments, caps and targets could be made at a sub-national, sec-toral, or multi-sectoral level, not only nationally. The UN climate change framework will give rec-ognition to these commitments under certain conditions, which will need to be elaborated. However, this issue goes beyond the scope of this discussion.
6.  Countries that transfer a unit of carbon reduc-tion outside the country will add to their in-ventory that amount of CO2 (e.g. +1). Countries that receive the unit transferred will see their 
... as the world changed and the new economic and emissions realities have taken hold, it becomes apparent that, while paying for rapid development was OK, subsidizing competition in globally competitive industries, especially in a time of grave economic crisis, was not acceptable
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inventory go down by the same amount (e.g. -1).
7.  The COP will have the prerogative of providing recognition for the units that Parties can use to comply with UNFCCC obligations. 
implicationsFrom a markets perspective, two important ele-ments stand out in the future climate change re-gime. One is the lack of AAUs. Their importance may not be well understood, but once they are re-moved from the infrastructure, the complications become self-evident. There is no “international” unit that provides the backstop to ensure environ-mental integrity and common accounting. There are no AAUs shadowing EU Allowances (EUA) and Australian units flowing between systems, thus keeping the accounting and environmental integrity whole.
The second element is the fact that all Parties will be expected to contribute, in a concrete way, to the goals of the Convention and may use markets as a tool. 
Markets under the KP were essentially trading among, or within, developed countries. Develop-ing countries were exporters of CERs.
In the new architecture, markets are also likely to occur within developing countries. Now, in addi-tion to the exiting flows, the flow of permits could 
expand from a North to North and South to North pattern to include South to South and maybe North to South flows.
role of markets in the post-2020 climate change agreement
In considering the role of markets in a post-2020 climate change agreement, we need to consider two issues: 
What is the role of markets in addressing climate change?
What is the role of carbon markets in a post-2020 climate change agreement?
role of markets in addressing climate changeThis discussion is not the main objective of this paper, but given the role and mandate of the UN, it is felt that that it needs, at a minimum, to be recognized and identified as an issue. 
Carbon markets are not an objective in them-selves, but are, and must be seen to be, a tool for price discovery, asset allocation and rational economic decision-making. Their role is to direct flows of investment into areas in which they might not otherwise go. It must be one of the elements of providing carbon finance.
Their role in technology Research and Devel-opment (R&D), piloting and deployment is not well understood. However, more and more re-search seems to indicate that markets cannot be everything to everyone, equally influential and determining at all stages of the technology cycle. 
Treating markets, their impacts and functioning separately at the national and international or UN levels does not take into account what real-life experience tells us. 
There is no “international” unit that provides the backstop to ensure environmental integrity and common accounting
45The Role of Market Mechanisms in a Post-2020 Climate Change Agreement
Carbon markets can play a pure national or re-gional role, but with a few exceptions, it is unlikely that they can function well if they are isolated. Small, illiquid markets are unlikely to produce good market functioning as defined through the ability to process a transfer without it causing significant price movements or loss of value of the asset being traded (ease of entry and exit, ab-sence of monopoly power, widespread availability of information, absence of market externalities, achievement of public interest objectives, suffi-cient liquidity, lack of large fluctuations, enough actors within the market, etc.). As such, their in-ternational dimension becomes, while not an ob-ligation, a necessity rather than a luxury.
A second observation is that experience with en-vironmental markets in general, and carbon mar-kets in particular, indicate that they can make a significant contribution to minimizing overall social costs in addressing climate change. How-ever, carbon markets need clarity of objectives, as multiple objectives will make them less efficient and reduce trust in their performance.
A third observation is that their long-term en-vironmental objectives must be recognized and their regulatory nature accepted. This is a hard lesson that the EU ETS is currently bringing home.
A regulator creates carbon markets, and regula-tors are rarely infallible. There is, at this stage of society, intervention in all markets, or the poten-tial to intervene if necessary. What is needed is flexibility built into the regulatory framework that will permit predictable and transparent interven-tion under well-understood conditions. 
As such, a strong and credible regulatory frame-work, with a competent and not politicized regu-
lator, is also an important element if markets are to be part of the toolbox.
Finally, carbon markets are not meant to be a sil-ver bullet. They play a precise role and need to be part of a suite of measures. They do not act alone, but need to be surrounded by other pol-icies and measures that complement them and that can address any side effects and interactions that emerge. This is also clearly emerging from the current debates surrounding the main carbon market, the EU ETS.
carbon markets and the post-2020 international agreement“Markets and the post-2020 agreement” are issues that can be addressed from different angles. 
A first approach is to analyse the potential place of carbon markets in a post-2020 agreement and the role they must play to ensure that any post-2020 agreement is successful. For that matter, are markets needed to make the next such agreement successful?
A second approach is to try and understand how a post-2020 agreement can contribute to the es-tablishment of a successful global carbon market. These two issues are not disconnected, yet they represent different questions.
Carbon markets are not an objective in themselves, but are, and must be seen to be, a tool for price discovery, asset allocation and rational economic decision-making
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Whether markets have any role to play in a post-2020 agreement was to some degree addressed in the section above. Markets, or market incentives, do have a role to play as a tool to ensure that cli-mate change finance is mobilized in an efficient and effective manner. Where appropriate, market analysis (though not always exclusively) should play a role in carbon finance, whether the source of money is public or private.
The role of market-based incentives should be to ensure that climate change constraints need to be internalized in the cost structure of society in general and in business in particular. They need to be part of series of tools, well regulated and seen to be so, but not promoted as the only ap-proach.
While business operates globally, the constraints that business (and society in general) responds to are usually domestic and local in nature, even if they represent a transposition of constraints re-sulting from international agreements. As such, indirectly, for market incentives to be present, there must be clear constraints that market actors can recognize and believe in. 
These constraints must also be supported by strong, long-term, stable recognition that they need to be observed. If business does not believe that the international constraints, cascaded to the national or local level, are there to stay, it is unlikely to act. That can be seen from the appli-cation of the KP and the translation of its com-mitments into national commitments, including cap-and-trade schemes. 
For many years Australia was not part of the KP, and now there are certainly sectors of that society, and economy, that are awaiting the result of the next election to see if the carbon-pricing scheme will really be part of their future. 
The same situation also exists in Canada, where the uncertainty over whether constraints will be imposed has resulted in the disappearance of the initially strong presence of Canadian companies in the nascent carbon market. This is all regulato-ry in nature, and a matter of confidence.
Secondly, the role of markets must be given clear and formal recognition as part of the agreement. This will allow it to contribute to the development of a carbon market, as well as other market ap-proaches. If that recognition is not enshrined, it will always be a struggle to have the agreement operationalized through elements such as an ITL, unit tracking systems, etc.
As such, it can be concluded that markets need to be present in the post-2020 agreement both directly and indirectly: indirectly, through clear constraints that allow for the creation of stable and credible market incentives; directly, through a mandate to play an active role, defined by the Parties, in the development of a global carbon market.
Markets need to be present in the post-2020 agreement both directly and indirectly: indirectly, through clear constraints that allow for the creation of stable and credible market incentives; directly, through a mandate to play an active role, defined by the Parties, in the development of a global carbon market
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It must be recognized that, at this point, the dis-cussion under “1bv, Various Approaches, etc.” is not part of the ADP agenda. Markets are simply not part of the ADP, at least not formally. 
role of the post-2020 agreement in carbon marketsGiven the assumptions made above, the post-2020 agreement can play a number of important roles in the development of a global carbon market.
The KP was “all in one”, creating the market, the market mechanisms and the infrastructure for a carbon market. From a market functioning point of view the arrangement was highly logical, and it all added up, but it proved ineffective in terms of getting the major Parties to join the global gov-ernance it implied. As a market it worked, but did not, and under the current realities cannot solve the environmental problem.
As such, the new agreement can help make the new realities work towards the creation of a car-bon market by providing flexibility, without losing sight of the key issue of environmental integrity. A post-2020 climate change agreement can have a number of key roles, as outlined below.
international in nature. Provisions in a post-2020 agreement can only apply to those markets sys-tems, and the units produced by them, that will cross international boundaries, and may be used for compliance in jurisdictions other than the ones in which they were created. If the market systems, and the units they create, are used for purely domestic compliance, there is no reason for the international regime to interfere with the creation, operation, or environmental value of such units. These will all be captured through an inventory system, in whatever format the interna-tional agreement will provide for.
It must be made clear, however, that one funda-mental principle must be that the international agreement, and system, should only provide those functions that are better provided at the inter-national level for a variety of reasons. This could be security, environmental integrity or cost. The default option must be that the function must be provided at the domestic level. In addition, in some cases the option could be available for the Party to make that choice and use an inter-national or multilateral service or infrastructure, or else develop its own. An easy example would be whether it wants to develop its own registry or would want to use a facility already in existence. 
accession to an international framework.A post-2020 international agreement can provide a framework under which domestic carbon mar-kets can accede to the international system. “Ac-cede” can be interpreted as becoming part of the international agreement, with the consequence that the units thus produced can be used for compliance with international/UNFCCC obliga-tions by a jurisdiction other than the one where they were created. How that accession is accom-plished will be an important part of a post-2020 international agreement. Most thinking currently sees two options, or a hybrid off the two, as being viable. 
•  One option is for the accession to be done through an “approval process”, whereby the COP “approves” a domestic system according to internationally agreed rules. Many Parties view 
Carbon markets need clarity of objectives, as multiple objectives will make them less efficient and reduce trust in their performance
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this approach with suspicion, as it is seen as in-terfering in their domestic carbon markets. The rigidity and micro-management of the CDM by the UNFCCC provides Parties with a good example not to follow. Some of them are more genuine than others in making this argument. 
•  Another approach has been called the “Trans-parency” or “Show and Tell” approach. Under this approach, the role of the international agreement is to provide a series of declaratory templates, possibly supplemented by a Peer Re-view system. In this case a domestic system may have to submit to the UNFCCC a declaration of its details under agreed templates, which may be peer reviewed, and the result could be put in the public domain. There is no approval at the end of this track, just the public availability of information. As an alternative, both tracks could be made available, with the Transparency Track being the default one. 
It is believed that the power of the “regulatory market” may push most Parties to use the “Ap-proval” track. Most Parties will be reluctant to explain why they do not submit their own systems to that track, as well as why they accept for com-pliance purposes units from other systems that have chosen not to go through an Approval track. The later may especially apply if they come from Parties that do not have an economy-wide cap. This is already observed in the case of JI Track 1 (national guidelines) and Track 2 (internation-al guidelines), where Parties, or entities, have a preference for units emanating from T2 projects, which is seen as having stronger environmental credentials. 
In addition, should this kind of market segmen-tation occur, with some units having better and broader access to markets for compliance, it is highly unlikely that this will not also translate 
into increased market value (as opposed to en-vironmental value, which only the regulator can confer). 
international compliance Unit (icU) (the crea-tion of an internationally recognized compliance unit). This is especially important given the as-sumed lack of AAUs in the post-2020 agreement as a “common currency”. While this is not an ab-solute necessity, it would simplify international accounting, the linking of domestic systems and international commercial transactions by creat-ing a more liquid market. An ICU would be issued, on demand, for domestic units that have crossed international boundaries, that originate from do-mestic systems, and that had already acceded to the international framework. 
infrastructure. infrastructure should be provided for a global carbon market to help Parties meet their UNFCCC compliance obli-gations. All the roles mentioned in this paper require an infrastructure, which can best be provided through international agreement. Two components that would immediately be seen as benefiting from definition through an interna-tional agreement would be an ITL and a system of standardized National Registries (NR). An ITL would ensure the transfer and tracking of units that cross international borders. It would also allow Parties to provide “filtering” instructions for transfers to national registries. For illustrative purposes, a Party may wish to accept in its NR only CERs from LDCs, units from certain geo-graphical areas, or units only from systems that acceded through an Approval track. 
National registries already exist for Annex 1 Par-ties under the KP. The same is true for national registries at the beginning of the EU ETS, which has currently moved to a Community Registry. This migration from twenty-seven registries to a 
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single registry was to a large degree a hard les-son that the EU has learned. It was driven by the realities of cost, capacity and security concerns. 
Options may be available in this case whereby the UNFCCC provides central registry services for those Parties that do not have the capacity, or do not wish to do it themselves. The same possibility could exist for other functions.
international environmental standards. The agreement can help ensure that the units used for compliance with UN obligations meet inter-nationally agreed environmental standards. This is closely related to the ICU discussion above. 
Under KP1 this was less of an issue, as all the units used for compliance (CERs, AAU, ERUs) were is-sued under the authority of the COP, and we knew that “a ton was a ton”. Where this emerged as an issue was for the CDM, where units were issued outside a cap, leading to strong debates on the sustainability features of the units produced.
A post-climate change agreement will need to put in place standards to preserve the environmental integrity of the international system. Such an en-vironmental standard will be developed under the authority of the COP and will be used, through a process to be defined, to determine if a domestic mechanism can accede to the international sys-tem. Such a standard may include, among others:
a.  Additionality, where appropriateb.  Baseline methodologies and crediting thresholdc.  A monitoring, reporting and verification approachd. Third-party verification
It should be emphasised that, while this standard will be defined and approved at the international level, many elements will be defined and deter-
mined in cooperation with the national level etc. As such, some interaction is necessary between the national and international levels.
Environmental integrity is one of the trio of ideas that defines sustainability. A word of caution is needed here. Ensuring that “a ton is a ton” is not to be confused with producing a global defini-tion of sustainability. While in many ways this is a goal that we should aspire to, at this stage such an approach would break a strong principle – that sustainability is the prerogative of each individual Party. 
A push in this direction, we believe, will damage the sustainability concept, as it will be seen by the developing world as an attempt to impose stand-ards and pathways for development on them. 
Provide information for accounting. Markets, by their very nature, will see a lot of transfers taking place between different Parties. An international agreement will need to provide support for the commercial aspect of markets by tracking and avoiding double accounting for all units, be they national or international. 
It must be emphasized that double counting can take place in a number of ways and that tracking must take place for 
•  Tracking units circulating internationally•  Avoiding double environmental counting•  Avoiding double counting of financial commit-ments
Double counting will be checked by the NR at the national level, upon issuance of domestic units. A national registry will have all necessary data to identify projects and installations that are in that jurisdiction. 
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A national registry will also have data on any UN mechanism, such as CDM, as it will need to is-sue a Letter of Approval. To have double counting checked internationally would imply that the reg-ulatory body and/or the ITL would have to track all domestic mechanisms in every country. This would be inefficient, not in keeping with the fun-damental principle of doing things at the national level wherever possible.
environmental exchange mechanism. This aspect ties into the discussions above on the ICU and on environmental integrity: “a ton is a ton”. Any envi-ronmental permit has two “values” associated with it: an Environmental Value and a Financial Value.
The Financial value is defined by the market, be-ing a function of supply and demand, liquidity, etc.
The only entity that can define Environmental Value is the regulator accepting a permit for com-pliance with an obligation it had imposed. As such it can determine that a unit for a domestic system is equal to a CO2 ton, and equal to an ICU. 
Alternatively, it could be decided that a multipli-cation factor needs to be applied and that a cer-tain unit is, for illustration purposes, only valued at 0.7ton=0.7 ICU.
A second case may emerge where units stemming from a domestic system that wishes to accede internationally may be expressed in units other than CO2, such as in terms of energy savings. An exchange rate from energy saving units to CO2 may need to be set, and any post-2020 Agreement may wish to set up a mechanism that determines the resulting Environmental Conversion Factor.
Proving internationally developed and operated market mechanisms for those Parties that do not have the capacity to develop their own systems, or choose not to do so. 
The CDM continues to be a prime example of a UNFCCC developed and operated mechanism, where the CDM EB sets very detailed standards and procedures for the creation of CERs, which are reductions from a baseline. 
What are currently generically called New Market Mechanisms (NMM), which are mechanisms be-ing developed under the Subsidiary Bodies and which are most likely Sectoral Trading and Sec-toral Crediting mechanisms, can also be seen as options for Parties that wish to use an “interna-tional rulebook” instead of developing their own domestic mechanisms.
In this category we could also put a REDD+ mech-anism, developed by the COP.
coherence between international and national regulators of the carbon markets. The lack of co-ordination has led to substantial damage to the functioning and reputation of the GHG market. Cases in point are industrial gas credits and “re-cycled CERs”, both perfectly all right for the inter-national regulator, but totally rejected by the EU.
... an international agreement can be a facilitator for the creation of a carbon market, contributing the coherence, and environmental integrity, needed for domestic systems to link together
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conclusions
The process of ensuring linking and a level play-ing field, strongly related to environmental integ-rity and competitiveness, will emerge as the next “big thing”. The international agreement can play a pivotal role without being heavy-handed.
Current provisions under KP’s Article 17 allow the linking of domestic systems in countries that have adhered to the Protocol. Many of the provisions under this section ensure that a post-2020 agree-ment can also play the same role.
Is this role necessary? If there is an international climate change agreement, with compliance pro-visions – the assumptions made for the purposes of this paper – then the answer is yes. The current preoccupation of the EU-Australia linking paper with ensuring treatment of AAUs is the best case that can be made. This does not mean a post-2020 agreement that mimics the KP. It means retaining that part of the KP agreement that facilitates the creation of a global carbon market, but allows a separate pathway for deciding the contribution that Parties make to addressing climate change.
As such, an international agreement can be a facilitator for the creation of a carbon market, contributing the coherence, and environmental integrity, needed for domestic systems to link to-gether. 
It could also be an operator for infrastructure, and certain type of markets mechanisms, used by Par-ties on a voluntary basis. The ITL, CDM and NMM are the best examples in this case.
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abstractStriking a balance between the development needs of countries and the need to reduce global emis-sions has proved challenging. Green growth offers a potential solution, namely approaching environ-mental sustainability as a vital and valuable asset for economic growth. Green growth views economic growth and environmental sustainability as mutually compatible objectives and makes limiting emissions an integral part of development plans. The poten-tial for green growth has been recognized by several countries with varying natural resources and income levels, demonstrating that environmental sustain-ability does not need to be sacrificed to achieve economic development. 
introduction 
Despite continuous mitigation efforts at the glob-al level, one of the most pressing environmental challenges we face today is the rising level of glob-al greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). According to the recent United Nations Environment Pro-gramme report (UNEP, 2012), which examines current global emissions, they are already con-siderably higher than the emissions level consist-ent with achieving the 2°C target in 2020 and are still growing. Especially as the economy is slowly picking up after the global downturn, and as the world prepares itself for a new climate agreement by 2015, the need to achieve the dual goals of economic growth and environmental sustainabil-ity is becoming an important one, especially for developing and emerging economies.
This is where green growth can play a role. Green growth is not a new concept. For the past 25 years, sustainable development and Agenda 21 have provided a helpful normative framework and a common general policy direction. However, the 
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international community has struggled to opera-tionalize the framework and find a practical for-mula for integrating its economic, social and, es-pecially, environmental dimensions into its overall development aspirations (Samans, 2013). Green growth aims to address this challenge. It is a par-adigm that simultaneously targets key aspects of 
both economic performance, such as poverty re-duction, job creation and social inclusion, and of environmental sustainability, such as mitigation of climate change (GGGI, 2012). Nevertheless, few governments or businesses have taken tru-ly decisive steps to shift to a green growth path. Many developing countries in particular see in-justice in any proposal hindering their ability to follow the development paths already taken by today’s economically advanced countries. At the same time, how to share the burden among coun-tries has been a continuing obstacle to achieving any significant progress in emission reductions (Zak and Lee, 2012). 
This article therefore aims to identify how imple-menting green growth at the national level can bridge the emission gap by addressing the politi-cal, financial, capacity and governance challeng-es that we face, particularly by developing and emerging economies. 
Framing green growth
More than twenty years after the first Rio Sum-mit in 1992, the world continues to face a twin 
challenge: expanding economic opportunities for all in the context of a growing global population and middle class; and addressing environmental pressures that, if left unaddressed, could under-mine our ability to seize these opportunities. Green growth is where these two challenges meet (OECD, 2012): it is about decoupling economic growth from negative environmental impacts. 
In other words, green growth means fostering econom-
ic growth and development while ensuring that natural 
assets continue to provide the resources and environ-
mental services on which our well-being relies. To do this it must catalyze investment and innovation, which will underpin sustained growth and give rise to new economic opportunities (OECD, 2011).  
Green growth also provides a practical and flexi-ble approach for achieving concrete, measurable progress across its economic and environmental pillars while taking account of the social conse-quences of greening the growth dynamic of econ-omies (OECD, 2011). 
However, integrating economic and environmen-tal goals is easy to say, but harder to implement. It takes real leadership to instill change, demon-strate a common vision of the future and bring about solid co-operation across ministries and various levels of government. It also involves un-derstanding how in the short term trade-offs need to be managed and reconciled with the desired long-term benefits (OECD, 2013). 
It is therefore important to have real cases where the green growth model has been implemented by countries and lessons learnt have been shared with interested countries. Successful cases can become an example to guide the further develop-ment and dissemination of green-growth strate-gies both regionally and globally.
... green growth means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies
55
green growth as a means to addressing the emissions gap
The UNEP Report (2011) concludes that poli-cy-makers could narrow or close the emissions gap by 2020 by:
•  Agreeing to implement their more ambitious emissions reduction pledges with stricter rules for complying with these pledges
•  Deciding to target their energy systems, using more non-fossil-fuel and renewable energy sources, and improving energy efficiency
•  Putting in place strong, long-term, sector-spe-cific policies to achieve the full emissions po-tential of the different economic sectors
However, countries, and particularly developing countries, are faced with political, financial, ca-pacity and governance challenges to put in place meaningful measures to address the emissions gap at the national level.
This may especially be the case if reducing emis-sions is a separate goal from a country’s economic development objectives. The green-growth mod-el, however, addresses precisely this challenge by pursuing growth and development plans that di-rectly incorporate zero-emissions growth or emis-sion-reduction goals.
Political challenge 
There are varying and often competing priorities that need to be considered when developing pol-icies associated with the governance of a country. Reducing a nation’s emissions which have direct link to its industrial development and economic growth can be politically challenging, all the more so when the political focus is on short-term gains 
and results. Developing countries have not shied away from expressing their reservations to curb their emissions when the top priorities in their political agenda are growth and poverty allevia-tion.
With this in mind, the green-growth concept begins from the premise that few if any politi-cal leaders will be prepared to sacrifice growth in employment and incomes in order to achieve environmental objectives. Despite the efforts made by the international community to main-stream environmental considerations into the development goals of developing countries, the 25-year-old operational tension between the eco-nomic and environmental pillars of sustainable development has yet to be resolved. Only when countries themselves decide to reengineer their growth models to produce strong economic and environmental performances simultaneously are these seemingly conflicting priorities likely to be resolved (Samans, 2013). 
Accordingly, green growth is concerned first with integrating environmental security and resource efficiency at the heart of a country’s economic development planning and implementation, ac-cepting a country’s growth targets as a given, rath-er than trying to adapt or subordinate them to a particular environmental agenda. A green-growth approach analyzes the policy options that could yield significant co-benefits for growth, environ-mental protection and resource security within the economy or its significant sectors (Samans, 2013). 
The green-growth concept begins from  the premise that few if any political leaders will be prepared to sacrifice growth in employment and incomes in order to achieve environmental objectives
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Some countries that have taken up the green-growth agenda, such as Ethiopia and Cambodia, have set up a central coordinating body strongly supported by the highest level of government to develop their national green-growth strategies and implementation plans
Green growth is thus a practical attempt to use economic policy to operationalize the normative frameworks represented by sustainable develop-ment. It seeks to fuse sustainable development’s three pillars into a single intellectual and poli-cy-planning process, thereby recasting the very essence of the development model so that it is capable of realizing sustained economic growth while safeguarding or improving the environment (Samans, 2013).
It is therefore anticipated that developing coun-tries implementing a green-growth strategy will be able to overcome some of the political challenges of conflicting priorities, as environmental impact, such as greenhouse gas emissions, and economic growth will be decoupled from the outset. 
Financial challenge
Even with the requisite political will, moving to a low-carbon economy can be an expensive under-taking. For example, changing a nation’s energy systems, using more non-fossil fuel and renewable energy sources, and improving energy efficiency require substantial upfront investment.
Climate finance has been a key topic in recent in-ternational climate negotiations. Understanding 
how much and what type of finance is available to promote low-carbon growth and combat cli-mate change at a global level is critical to scaling up finance and ensuring that resources are used effectively (Buchner et al., 2012). 
Over the past decade, there has been considera-ble experimentation with and piloting of public–private partnerships related to addressing climate change. The crucial challenge is to move this ac-tivity to scale. 
The green growth model seeks to spur progress in this regard at two levels:
•  Facilitate countries’ access to the domestic and international capital needed to implement the key sectoral priorities of their green growth plans; and
•  Catalyze and provide institutional support for the creation of standards and other incentive frameworks that have the potential to main-stream resource efficiency considerations in corporate capital allocation and management practices more generally. 
Through this effort, a country implementing its green-growth strategy could streamline financing mechanisms and channel funds that address in-vestment priorities that would result in both eco-nomic growth and climate-change proofing.
capacity and governance challenge
Lack of capacity has been one of the limiting fac-tors faced by developing countries when trying to address the climate challenge. Numerous in-ternational initiatives have focused on building capacity in countries to help them better address the issue. However, capacity-building efforts have been piecemeal at best and often overlapping. 
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Building capacity is a long-term endeavor, much like the development, planning and implemen-tation process for a green-growth strategy. By developing national green-growth strategies and plans, the process will itself help build capacity and ownership in the countries through “learn-ing by doing” in a more coherent and structured manner.
Strengthening the capacity for learning and sound decision-making in order to monitor, im-plement and enforce green-growth policies effec-tively will include developing capacity and human resources in technical and managerial areas and assessment and monitoring at multiple levels of government (OECD, 2013).
Moreover, the climate challenge cannot be prop-erly addressed if it is put into disciplinary silos. Better coordination and linkages between dif-ferent but inter-connected issues and actors, in-cluding between various levels of government, are necessary.
Green growth can address all of these challenges if it is centrally and holistically integrated into national development plans, which requires in-ter-ministerial level cooperation and coordination among different levels of government. This may require reforms and innovation in governance at the local and national levels that can simultane-ously tackle economic, social and environmental issues.
Some countries that have taken up the green-growth agenda, such as Ethiopia and Cambodia, have set up a central coordinating body strongly supported by the highest level of government to develop their national green-growth strategies and implementation plans. Re-aligning the gov-ernance structure to facilitate communication and coordination between the different minis-
tries and actors enables countries to prioritize their economic development and environmental objectives in an integrated and holistic manner, thereby reducing inefficiencies and enhancing benefits across different policies.
elements for developing a new approach 
elements of a green-growth strategy for bridging the emissions gapOne of the bottlenecks in pushing forward the post-Kyoto regime has been the fact that devel-oping countries also have a sovereign right to economic development, which, given the fossil fuel-based development paradigm, can only be fulfilled by increasing their greenhouse gas emis-sions (Aldy and Stavins, 2011).
However, there are practical elements in develop-ing countries adopting a green-growth strategy that can allow them to contribute meaningfully to bridging the global emissions gap.
Reducing emissions need not be at the cost of economic growth and development
Developing countries face domestic imperatives for economic growth. The good news is that green growth is essentially about economic growth – long-term and sustained economic growth. It is about developing a strategy and road map to achieve a desired level of national income, job creation and wealth, but with due consideration to environmental challenges and opportunities. Green growth recognizes the symbiotic relation-ship that the economic system has with other sys-tems, in particular the natural system. 
Therefore, using green growth to address the emissions challenge can be considered more po-litically palatable and practical in incentivizing 
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developing countries to participate in the next phase of global efforts to address climate change.
Increasing financial flows are targeting both develop-ment and low-carbon initiatives 
It is estimated that annual climate-finance flows reached an average of USD 364 billion in 2010/2011 (Buchner et al., 2012), with more than 60 per cent coming from private finance. 
When climate finance is a component of a larger national green-growth strategy and implementa-tion plan, financial sources for development and for addressing climate change can be combined and managed in a more coordinated and effec-tive way. This configuration may also facilitate the leveraging of public investment to draw in private capital for low-carbon and climate-resilient eco-nomic growth in developing countries.
Countries take ownership of their development agenda and embed measures for addressing the climate chal-lenge
As a green-growth plan begins on the basis of a country’s domestic economic development agen-da, there is increased ownership and interest in building internal capacity and appropriate gov-ernance structures to operationalize it. It is a bot-tom-up, action-oriented, economic policy agen-
da led for all practical purposes by developing countries, rather than a top-down, norm-driven, environmental policy agenda led by international public and civil-society institutions.
Moreover, as low-carbon measures are embedded in the national green-growth strategy and imple-mentation plan, countries will be able to con-tribute to addressing the climate challenge while pursuing their development goals.
ethiopia’s climate-resilient green  economy strategy 
backgroundEthiopia seeks to become a middle-income coun-try by 2025. Under a BAU scenario, annual emis-sions in Ethiopia are expected to increase from 150 MtCO2e to approximately 400 MtCO2e be-tween 2008 and 2030 (Federal Democratic Re-public of Ethiopia, 2011). This will be due to vari-ous factors and will be amplified as Ethiopia works to maintain its speed of economic growth, which will require increased agricultural productivity, strengthening of its industrial base and strong-er export-led growth. This will not only lead to increased levels of CO2e emissions, it also runs the risk of locking Ethiopia into outdated tech-nologies and will place significant burdens on Ethiopia’s resources, both natural and financial, as Ethiopia is forced to spend increasing levels of its GDP on fuel imports to keep up with growing demand. Further, over USD 50 billion (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2011) is esti-mated to be required over the next five years for infrastructure development, resulting in a sig-nificant financing gap between what is required and the projected funds available to finance these projects. 
As low-carbon measures are embedded in the national green-growth strategy and implementation plan, countries will be able to contribute to addressing the climate challenge while pursuing their development goals
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climate-resilient green-economy (crge) strategyThe Ethiopian government has taken the initia-tive in pursuing a green and sustainable growth path, culminating in the creation and adoption of the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy. The CRGE strategy prioritizes sectors of Ethiopia’s economy and identifies pathways to green development in these sectors. The GGGI has worked with the Ethiopian government to create a series of recommendations based on an analysis of the potential for sustainable economic growth and projected GHG emissions levels, eval-uating and prioritizing initiatives based on their economic growth potential combined with their abatement costs. These projections were done in line with the objectives of Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan. Further, these recommen-dations are projected to reduce Ethiopia’s CO2 emissions by up to 30 per cent from 2030 BAU levels while maintaining economic growth. The sector-level strategies identified also have a po-tential reduction of approximately 230 MtCO2e by 2030 (GGGI, 2011).
The CRGE strategy includes over sixty initia-tives that enable Ethiopia to remain on course to reach middle-income status while limiting its GHG emissions in 2030 to today’s levels. Fur-ther, abatement costs are less than USD 15 per ton CO2e for over 80 per cent of the abatement potential, with numerous initiatives offering pos-itive returns on investments (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2011). A green-growth path would enable Ethiopia to keep emissions at to-day’s levels while creating jobs and fostering eco-nomic growth.
The green-growth path laid out by the CRGE strategy approaches development from a holis-tic standpoint, fostering the linkages between various goals and sectors, and is based on four 
main pillars. The first is improving crop and live-stock production practices, aimed at increasing food security and farmer income while reducing emissions. This is significant given Ethiopia’s ag-riculture-based society and the high quantities 
of emissions that are the result of agricultural practices. The second pillar involves protecting and re-establishing forests for both their econom-ic and ecosystem services, including their value as carbon stocks. Third, the CRGE strategy seeks to expand electricity generation from renewable sources of energy for domestic and regional mar-kets. The fourth pillar involves utilizing improve-ments in technology to leapfrog to modern and energy-efficient technologies in the transporta-tion, building and industrial sectors.
However, such a green development path will require approximately USD 150 billion over the next twenty years (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2011). Clearly, funding will need to come from multiple sources, both foreign and domestic, and will need to be utilized efficiently and effec-tively to maximize results. To facilitate financing, a CRGE facility to streamline the funding process has been established.
climate resilient green economy (crge) Facility An issue that Ethiopia has faced in its develop-ment funding is fragmentation, meaning that mul-tiple donors agree to finance particular areas of 
The CRGE strategy includes over sixty initiatives that enable Ethiopia to remain on course to reach middle-income status while limiting its GHG emissions in 2030 to today’s levels
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Ethiopia’s development but on a piecemeal and bilateral basis. This raises the issue of donor over-lap in projects and increases the amount of time and resources devoted to reporting, measurement and verification of what can be small amounts of financing. The CRGE Facility addresses this by allowing the Ethiopian government to channel funds into a central “account” and then disburse those funds in accordance with its development priorities and needs. This allows development projects and funding to be centralized and en-sures that the Ethiopian government is aware of all agreements.
A second issue addressed through the CRGE Fa-cility is fragmentation among government min-istries. The CRGE Facility is to be administered by a CRGE Management Committee, composed of representatives from relevant and appropriate line ministries. This ensures coordination at the highest levels of government and facilitates com-munication and information sharing between ministries while mainstreaming climate action into national policy, as the Ministries of Environ-ment, Land, Transport, Finance and others come together as one body to create national develop-ment and growth plans.
The CRGE Facility receives international, nation-al, public and private financing. This money is then pooled, and a technical committee deter-
mines how the money should be spent based on economic and development analyses.
The CRGE Facility concept has been favorably received by donor nations involved in Ethiopia, demonstrating that such a concept can be sup-ported by donors and that a mechanism for estab-lishing trust in the use of funds can be developed.
cambodia’s green-growth master Plan 
backgroundSince the end of several decades of conflict, Cambodia has sprung from a state of near total destruction and achieved remarkable progress in a number of areas significant to human devel-opment. Economically, Cambodia recorded high growth rates of around 10 per cent during the first half of the past decade through the support of foreign direct investment in the mining and construction sectors and strong exports in textile and garments. The global financial crisis in 2008-2009, however, inevitably affected the inflow of foreign capital into Cambodia and brought down the export demand from major trading partners. In 2010, Cambodia’s economy began recovering from the global financial crisis and recorded a growth rate of 5.8 per cent, with substantial re-covery in many major industries.
Even with the rapid economic growth achieved, poverty remains high and the country’s ranking in human development terms reflects the difficult living conditions of Cambodians. Among the pop-ulation of 14.1 million in 2010, 25% lives below the total poverty line. Especially in rural areas, the vast majority of people live and work at a sub-sistence level. 
Moreover, the economic activities that Cambodia has undertaken to rebuild its economy have had a huge impact on its environmental system and are 
The CRGE Facility addresses this by allowing the Ethiopian government to channel funds into a central “account” and then disburse those funds in accordance with its development priorities and needs
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creating imbalances that can put its development at risk. In order to sustain growth in a situation of vulnerability to climate change, Cambodia re-alized the need to follow a new paradigm of eco-nomic growth while at the same time adapting itself to the impacts of climate change. Therefore, putting green growth at the heart of Cambodia’s development goals was a natural choice to make, and has led to the formulation of Cambodia’s Na-tional Green Growth Roadmap (NGGR).
nggr and national green growth  master Plan
The NGGR explains Cambodia’s challenges, needs, status, and opportunities for green growth. Its goal is to facilitate sustainable economic growth by promoting sustainable consumption and production, greening markets and businesses, and creating a favorable climate for the establish-ment of sustainable infrastructure (GGGI, 2013). 
NGGR has also been the key element in develop-ing Cambodia’s National Green Growth Master Plan (GGMP). The GGMP has been prepared in line with the Cambodian government’s efforts and strategies to achieve poverty reduction and sus-tainable development, although there is no spe-cific emission reduction target at this stage. The vision of the GGMP is to lead Cambodia towards green growth. Its major objectives are to: 
1.  assess Cambodia’s green growth potential;
2.  create institutional and legal systems to im-plement and monitor green-growth policy ef-ficiently and effectively; 
3.  identify priority sectors for Cambodia’s green growth; and
4.  establish a holistic approach presenting strate-gic guidelines and action plans consistent with Cambodia’s current national development plan and the NGGR. 
institutional Framework Policy FrameworkRoyal decree for The National Council on Green Growth (NCGG) 7 Accesses: Cambodia’s sectorial developmentSub decree on The General Secretariat of the National Council on Green Growth (GSGG) National Strategic Pan on Green Growth (NSPGG)
Projects to promote green growth
monitoring through green growth index
 Promote and implement green growth effectively in cambodia
+
Scheffler-Reflector Green village Green jobs
Figure 1: Policy scheme of cambodia’s ggmP
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Figure 1 depicts the broad framework that the GGMP envisions, consisting of two major frame-works which are institutional and policy-oriented. With the establishment of the National Coun-cil on Green Growth (NCGG) and the Gener-al Secretariat of the Council on Green Growth (GSGG), these institutions will provide direction for green-growth policy and formulate strategies at the government level, thereby enabling GGMP to offer firm governing mechanisms to promote green growth. This has been expressed in the vi-sion statement from the National Policy on Green Growth prepared by the Cambodian National Council on Green Growth (NCGG, 2013), which states that “The national policy is envisaged to strike a balance of economic development with environment, society, culture and sustainable use of natural resources through integration, matching and adaptation, as well as harmonization between the green growth principle and national policy”.
Moreover, with the policy framework suggesting increased access to seven major sectors for Cam-bodia’s green growth, the country’s development could be supported by specific implementation plans. Cambodia’s sectoral development through the seven Accesses is further expanded in the Na-tional Strategic Plan on Green Growth (NSPGG). The functionality of both institutional and policy frameworks is tested through demonstration pro-jects and monitored through the Green Growth Index, which can be fed back into updating the GGMP (GGGI, 2013).
An important element of the GGMP involves em-bedding local-level initiatives into the plan in or-der to spread the seeds of green growth. Some of the first initiatives inspired through the GGMP include the construction of a Scheffler Reflec-tor and the creation of a green village, foster-ing green employment in the process. The next step in carrying out the GGMP at the local level 
is to enhance local capacity by promoting small businesses that capitalize on the demonstration projects, national policies and frameworks that promote green growth.
United arab emirates’ national strategy  for green growth
background The United Arab Emirates (UAE), with a popula-tion of over eight million and a GDP per capita of USD 48,000, is one of the wealthiest nations in the world. Possessing the world’s seventh largest oil reserves and fifth largest natural gas reserves, the UAE has benefited economically from its nat-ural resources.
However, the UAE is highly vulnerable to the ef-fects of climate change and is particularly vul-nerable to sea level rise and changes in annual temperatures, which would have an impact on its dry-land ecosystem and water resources. Ener-gy-related activities account for the majority of the UAE’s total emissions, and a rapidly growing population means increasing needs for energy and water resources.
Recognizing this, the UAE has taken the lead in pursuing green growth and has recognized the po-tential benefits, both economically and environ-mentally, of committing itself to such a develop-ment strategy. The UAE government aims to have 30 per cent of the electrical power in Abu Dhabi coming from low carbon and renewable sources by 2020, and it will be able to utilize its potential, particularly in solar energy, to achieve this. 
national strategy for green growth (nsgg)
In January 2013, the UAE launched its National Strategy for Green Growth (NSGG) at the World 
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Future Energy Summit. The NSGG integrates ex-isting national policies and measures for climate change mitigation and adaptation and aligns them with the economic development objectives of the UAE. It involves a range of key sectors such as agriculture, energy, investment and sustainable transport and supports the UAE’s goal of becom-ing a key center for the export of green products and technologies while fostering long-term eco-nomic growth in a sustainable manner.
The NSGG has its roots in the UAE Green Growth Initiative, drawn up in partnership with the GGGI beginning in March 2011. Formally launched in January 2012 as the UAE Strategy for Green De-velopment, this is a nine-year initiative dedicated to the development of a sustainable economy led by the Ministry of Environment and Water and in-volving the collaboration of both the Prime Min-ister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This initiative includes the creation of a business plan setting out integrated, synergistic programs for green-growth planning, including the estab-lishment of a GHG inventory system and inten-sive capacity-building programs and spanning all seven emirates of the UAE. It involves four main areas of focus: policy and governance, data man-agement, capacity-building and renewable ener-gy-based micro-grids.
The UAE Strategy for Green Development also involves partners across sectors and boundaries, including the aforementioned ministries and technical taskforces across seven major sectors. This strategy involves cooperation across the UAE emirates, across ministries and between the pub-lic and private sector, both domestically and in-ternationally, and has high-level political support, demonstrating what can be accomplished when development policy planning is done holistically.
Two initial studies for the UAE in support of its Green Growth Initiative have been carried out: a situation analysis looking at the existing institu-tional mandates and capacities at both the federal and ministerial levels, as well as policy approach-es, reports and available data; and a benchmark study detailing green growth best practices at the global level, with objectives and policy options de-veloped from this.
The NSGG builds on key federal initiatives, such as the UAE Vision 2021, announced in February 2010. This initiative lays out a unified approach towards sustainable development involving both the public and private sectors. The NSGG will continue to be developed throughout 2013, ul-timately identifying low-carbon green-growth opportunities in key sectors of the UAE econo-my, including oil and gas, water, transport, con-struction, waste, land use and biodiversity. It will contain various specific policy objectives, recom-mendations and measures tailored to the UAE’s situation and needs while taking into account both the strengths and weaknesses of implement-ing a green-growth policy. This allows the UAE to engage in pragmatic, realistic projections that enable it to maintain desired levels of economic 
Formally launched in January 2012 as the UAE Strategy for Green Development, this is a nine-year initiative dedicated to the development of a sustainable economy led by the Ministry of Environment and Water and involving the collaboration of both the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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growth while pursuing the realization of its envi-ronmental and international emissions goals. 
Another component of the UAE’s commitment to green and sustainable practices is the Masdar City Initiative, a USD 15 billion program to build Mas-dar City outside Abu Dhabi. Designed to be the world’s first zero-carbon sustainable city, Masdar City is designed to incorporate best practices in sustainable urban planning, design, development and cooperation, with the aim of capturing up to five million tons of CO2 per year from power plants (Zero Emission Resource Organization, 2012).
The UAE’s commitment to and investment in re-newable energies and technologies is the result of high-level coordination between government bodies and strong political leadership. Through this process, various actors have been involved, and green and sustainable growth has been di-rectly and centrally integrated into national de-velopment plans. The UAE has realized that it does not have to choose between economic growth and environmental sustainability—it can have both.
conclusion 
Green growth offers a new pathway for develop-ment, one that integrates environmental sustain-ability and low-carbon development directly into economic growth plans, thereby ensuring that en-vironmental factors are given adequate priority. Economic growth and environmental sustainabil-
ity are approached from the perspective of mutu-ally compatible objectives rather than opposing forces, with the understanding that preserving the sustainability of natural resources will yield significant benefits without sacrificing economic prosperity.
Ethiopia, Cambodia and the UAE offer three sep-arate cases of states in various regions and with differing economies that have recognized the po-tential benefits of transitioning to a green-growth development plan. In all three cases, there is high level of political commitment across multiple key ministries, ensuring the long-term commitment of the government and the coordination of vital players, and the integration of emissions-reduc-ing mechanisms into development plans, or, in the case of Cambodia, a basic framework where emis-sion reduction mechanisms can be developed. These plans also take into account the need for the development of financial mechanisms that will attract and facilitate private financing. 
Green-growth strategies and plans offer the po-tential to help both developing and developed countries reach their domestic growth goals while facilitating commitments to lower emissions at the international level. They allow states to value natural resources, thus improving the economic livelihood and living environment for the people. They represent a balance between domestic am-bitions and the need of the international commu-nity to limit and lower emissions to ensure that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which the well-be-ing of the global community relies.
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 abstract The next three years will be pivotal for the interna-tional response to the crisis of global deforestation. Despite the progress made to date, there are still challenges facing REDD+ as we embark on the process of defining the architectural framework for a global deal. This article recommends that the Conference of the Parties designs such a framework to attract long-term, sustained investment from both public and private sources and encourage early investment. It should do this by establishing a formal prompt start programme for REDD+ activi-ties through collaboration on harmonized MRV and safeguards, with the best practices being developed now in the national, sub-national and voluntary regimes to ensure the highest degree of integrity for REDD+ at all levels. 
introduction 
Forests play an integral role in the global carbon cycle and in maintaining healthy ecosystems, both of which are vital to humanity’s immediate and long-term economic security. But the prevailing economic model of forest management has been based almost entirely upon the extraction of sale-able resources such as timber and the conversion of land to other uses. The international commu-nity has attempted to address the crisis of tropical deforestation through numerous measures, but forests are still being destroyed at an alarming rate.1 
1  For an overview of the decades-long history of tropical forest manage-ment under international legal mechanisms, see O’Sullivan et al. 2009. 
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In light of this, there is now strong momentum supporting the view that lasting and workable solutions for climate change mitigation and adap-tation, human well-being and specifically North-South equality all rely heavily on intact forests and functioning natural ecosystems. There are high expectations that a mechanism addressing glob-al emissions reductions and national non-carbon development benefits linked to forests will con-stitute an important part of the global climate 
agreement envisaged for 2015 under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC). The REDD+ mechanism currently being shaped within the UNFCCC carries with it great responsibility as well as promise. Concluding a successful REDD+ mechanism as part of a 2015 agreement offers hope that the current market failures can be corrected, marking the beginning of a new economic paradigm that strikes the right balance between the critical need to preserve our forests and the need to meet the growing demands of an increasing global population for food, fuel and resources. Progress on REDD+ has been made over the past several years, including its status as a stand-alone mechanism, as well as the adoption of REDD activities as part of many developing coun-tries’ Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Measures (NAMAs) submissions to the UNFCCC. However, work on REDD+ has slowed recently, as the focus of the Conference of Parties (CoP) has been con-
sumed by the broader issues of mitigation targets and the make-up of the post-Kyoto regime. At the latest meeting in Doha, the CoP decided to un-dertake a work programme in 2013 with the aim of contributing to the on-going efforts to scale up and improve the effectiveness of finance for REDD+ activities, focussing on: (1) ways to trans-fer payments for results-based actions; (2) ways to incentivize non-carbon benefits; and (3) ways to improve the coordination of results-based fi-nance (Doha COP decision, para 29). The results of this work programme will be critical to the de-velopment of the REDD+ mechanism under the UNFCCC and will inform non-UNFCCC REDD+ activities. 
In this article, we examine the current state of REDD+ as it is emerging within the UNFCCC negotiations and provide several recommenda-tions to the CoP as it considers its 2013 work programme. This includes the need for the CoP: 1) to design the REDD+ programme to include a financing approach that will attract scaled, sus-tained private participation in order to attract the requisite level of financing, given the shrinking capacity of governments to fund REDD+ activities alone; 2) to collaborate with non-UNFCCC actors in the development of system-wide, credible and transparent monitoring, reporting and verifica-tion (MRV) procedures, as well as environmental and social safeguards for REDD+ activities, and to encourage the adoption of similar standards at all jurisdictional levels; and 3) to encourage REDD+ investment now, in advance of 2020, by establishing a formal prompt start programme for credible REDD+ activities. 
With a thoughtful, ambitious and integrated ap-proach, a REDD+ mechanism as part of a 2015 agreement can serve to shore up early support for REDD+ and lead the way towards a compre-hensive REDD+ response that matches the level 
Lasting and workable solutions for climate change mitigation and adaptation, human well-being and specifically North-South equality all rely heavily on intact forests and functioning natural ecosystems. 
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of the global crisis and rises to the challenge of history that is now before us.
setting the stage
Since CoP13 in Bali, collective efforts to agree on the scope and design of REDD+ have made important progress. The parties have agreed that REDD+ includes not only activities that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degra-dation, but also the sustainable management of natural forests and the restoration of degraded forests, as well as environmentally appropriate af-forestation and reforestation. The need for scaled financing from multiple sources, both public and private, has been agreed, while the specific means by which to attract and channel such financing remain undecided.
A brief review of the UNFCCC negotiating histo-ry for REDD+ is instructive in helping to fashion the final critical pieces. REDD+ was first intro-duced as a concept by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea at CoP11 in Montreal. As part of the Bali Action Plan drawn up at CoP13 in Bali, the parties formalized an effort to promote policy approach-es and positive incentives for REDD+ (1/CP.13, para 1(b)(iii)). At CoP 15, the Copenhagen Accord recognised the crucial role of REDD+ in achiev-ing climate goals and stated the “need to provide positive incentives…through the immediate es-tablishment of a (REDD+) mechanism…to enable the mobilization of financial resources from devel-oped countries”. While not ultimately included in the Copenhagen Accord, there was also high-level agreement on the need for environmental and so-cial safeguards to be a main component of the envisaged REDD+ mechanism.
At CoP16 in Cancun, REDD+ emerged as one of the unifying elements to help the parties advance on a number of important fronts. There were sev-
eral notable REDD+ decisions, which continue to frame the negotiations, including in respect of en-vironmental and social safeguards, MRV at the na-tional and sub-national levels, and consideration of financing from both market and non-market sources. (1/CP.16). The Cancun Agreements also guided “Fast Start” funding from developed coun-tries, which was intended to focus approximately twenty per cent of the estimated USD 30 billion pledged between 2010 and 2012 on REDD+ ac-tivities, such as assisting countries with national inventories, capacity-building and the develop-ment of demonstration projects to pave the way for results-based finance. 
REDD+ held its ground at CoP17 in Durban but did not materially advance from the Cancun Agreements. At CoP17, the parties “considered” that both market-based and non-market-based approaches could be developed by the CoP to support results-based actions, consistent with the REDD+ decisions embodied within the Can-cun Agreements (2/CP.17, paragraphs 66 and 67). More broadly, Durban was significant in that the parties committed to agree, by 2015, “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applica-ble to all Parties” to take effect in 2020 (1/CP.17, paragraph 2). Durban also “defined” a single new 
market-based mechanism that will operate under the UNFCCC along with other market- and non-market-based approaches known as the “frame-work for various approaches” (NMM/FVA)(1/CP.17, paragraph 83).
REDD+ was first introduced as a concept by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea at CoP11 in Montreal. 
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At CoP18 in Doha, the majority of negotiating bandwidth was consumed by the expiry of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. As for REDD+, Doha similarly made only marginal progress. Donor countries led by Norway pushed for an independent, international verification process overseen by experts, but Brazil and some other host countries were unwilling to commit to such external verification requirements. MRV dis-cussions became tied up with finance, leading to the deferring of any substantive decisions (or pro-gress) for REDD+. Instead, a work programme was established to make recommendations to the CoP in Warsaw on these and other remaining technical issues being addressed under SBSTA and the fi-nancing discussions that had been covered under the AWG-LCA (4/CP.18, paragraph 25). The CoP decided that the aim of the work programme is to contribute to the on-going efforts to scale up and improve the effectiveness of finance for REDD+ activities, taking into account: (1) ways to trans-fer payments for results-based actions; (2) ways to incentivize non-carbon benefits; and (3) how to improve the coordination of results-based finance (4/CP.18, paragraph 29). 
While the present article does not attempt to answer all of the outstanding issues related to a REDD+ agreement, its recommendations on pri-vate finance, harmonized MRV and safeguards, 
and a prompt start mechanism may provide help-ful perspectives to “Durbin Platform for Enhanced Action” Parties and SBSTA for the 2013 work pro-gramme and beyond. 
Harnessing Finance for reDD+
One of the biggest challenges for the CoP is to determine how best to attract adequate and sustained investment in REDD+ activities. The imperative for ensuring that the financial com-ponent of REDD+ is fit for purpose is increased when one considers that improved land-use man-agement will represent one-third of the overall global abatement potential by 2030 and that it is in large part achievable at relatively low esti-mated costs2 and with readily-available technol-ogies (Coren et al. 2011, Kindermann et al. 2008, White 2010). Any discussion of REDD+ finance must also acknowledge at the outset the estimat-ed annual spending required to achieve the lev-el of reductions in terrestrial emissions deemed necessary by the IPCC to meet the mitigation targets specified in the Cancun Agreements and reiterated in the Durban Platform. Metrics vary, but prominent and often cited analyses put the annual cost of reducing deforestation by at least fifty per cent in 2020 at between 15 and 45 billion dollars (Eliasch 2007, Meridian Institute 2009). Contrasted to the seven billion dollars in aggre-gate public ‘fast-start’ finance dedicated to forests in the 2010-12 period, the majority view now is that this significant ‘funding gap’ will require pri-vate-sector involvement if reduction goals are to be met. Despite the power of such cost estimates to illustrate a sense of urgency, they are in many ways unhelpful, becoming something of a light-ening rod in the (increasingly ideological) debate 
2  Relative to nuclear energy, some renewables, carbon capture and storage and a large portion of the abatement potential across industrial sectors.
The funding gap aside, it should then be evident that there can be no effective solution that does not have as its central focus the sector of the world economy that is serving as the ‘engine’ of the problem (Hulse et al. 2013)
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over finance sourcing and channels (particularly where markets are concerned).
Some, however, continue to question a priori the ‘if, how and why’ of private-sector involvement in REDD+ (FERN 2011, Munden Project 2011). As a necessary step towards addressing these ques-tions, it might be helpful to assess in a practi-cal way if, and to what degree, it is appropriate that private-sector finance should be engaged as a source to fund REDD+ (rather than simply ask-ing if private-sector finance is needed to fill a an obvious gap). If we first consider this question alongside the dual facts (a) that global trade in forest products will be worth an estimated $450 billion annually by 20203 and (b) that the ‘pri-vate sector’ (large and small, local and interna-tional) controls or participates in approximately three-quarters of overall global financial flows, it becomes clear that deforestation is occurring on such a large scale because it is profitable for those making decisions on land use and because market economies4 are benefitting from it (at least per-ceptibly) in the short term (PoW 2012, Grantham 2011). The funding gap aside, it should then be evident that there can be no effective solution that does not have as its central focus the sector of the world economy that is serving as the ‘en-gine’ of the problem (Hulse et al. 2013). 
With populations growing dramatically in devel-oping countries, and given their justifiable aspira-tion to enjoy the fruits of economic development that until now have largely been the privilege of 
3  The trade in products and commodities sourced from forests and identified as chief drivers in deforestation, including timber, pulp and paper, beef, soya and palm, is projected to rise from $257 billion in 2005. Similar increases are expected for gold, coal, aluminium and rare metals. Compounding these trends is the fact that the market incentives for many key commodities that is driving deforestation currently encourage the extension of land use, rather than the intensification of production.4  Subsistence activities comprise no more than an estimated 15-20% of global deforestation today, but as rural communities become increasingly connected with cash economies and as populations rise, the lines between traditional and cash-driven economies will continue to blur.
the industrialised world, food and resource secu-rity are headline priorities and will become bigger still. Globally, the FAO estimates that over $80 billion in agricultural investment will be required annually to feed nine billion-plus people in 20505 (PWC, 2012). At the moment, price premiums for sustainably produced commodities are limited, and the capital barriers to environmentally effi-cient production are high in most producer coun-tries. The opportunity is there for REDD+ to build transformational linkages with the agricultural sector, combining increased productivity with incentives for reduced environmental footprints (Walker et al 2013). A failure to do so could mean that our forest conservation, climate change mit-igation (and adaptation) and food security goals all fall short. 
Today, private-sector involvement in the conser-vation of forests in developing countries (wheth-er approached from the angle of REDD+, or sus-tainable commodities, or payments for ecosystem services) stands in stark contrast to the scale of their business-as-usual activities, and is in most cases defined by a relatively small handful of com-mitted firms (or in some cases, individuals) that have taken the time to understand and build a business case or related corporate social respon-sibility strategy. These ‘voluntary’ private-sector actors have teamed up with NGOs, forest commu-nities and government agencies to make relevant progress at the “project level” on complex issues such as land tenure, benefits-sharing arrange-ments, environmental and social safeguards, leak-age, permanence, nested MRV and accounting standards (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012). To avoid the loss of patience, fatigue and exit by early-stage private financiers, intermediaries and forward-thinking forest communities that will be 
5  Today in the developing world, approximately two-thirds of the $189 billion invested in agriculture is private, and the majority of this domesti-cally sourced. 
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vital to the successful achievement of REDD+ at the jurisdictional level, strong policy signals are needed now to provide some certainty that private participants will have a role to play in a future UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism. 
Assuming the best case outcomes for an agree-ment in 2015, an effective date of 2020 also presents challenges for forest countries whose ministers have begun to make progress toward improving the essential capacity to administer domestic REDD+ programmes, and who have even welcomed pilot projects and embraced the possi-bility of REDD+ financing from the private sector, but who now see no immediate pathway towards receiving the value promised for preserving their natural capital. 
In the recognition of private finance as a necessary component of a global REDD+ mechanism, we can still achieve a policy breakthrough, providing a strong signal to governments, civil society and the private sector that will drive scaled investment in REDD+. Similarly, the future REDD+ regime requires a holistic approach to address the driv-ers of deforestation that will necessarily take the form of multiple, nationally appropriate, comple-
mentary actions, of which a REDD+ credit trading programme may be only one. How complemen-tary measures work together with market-based approaches to yield the greatest social, economic and environmental benefits at the lowest social and economic costs remains a challenging equa-tion to solve precisely in a prescriptive fashion at the outset. Public and private investment could collaborate in any one or more of the following vehicles: a UNFCCC-led global REDD+ market as part of the NMM/FVA; one or more REDD+ bonds; a dedicated REDD+ window under the Green Cli-mate Fund; and/or domestically defined elements of REDD+ achievements (for instance, many de-veloping countries have included REDD activities as NAMAs in their submissions to the UNFCCC), as well as other interim measures set up bilater-ally or multilaterally6 (PWC, 2011). Under each of these possible vehicles, proven successes on the ground will still be essential in order to draw in capital markets at scale. It is important to recog-nize and embrace the possibility that the REDD+ mechanism may evolve into a multifaceted ap-proach, one element of which could be a REDD+ credit trading system giving value to demonstrat-ed performance on the ground and, together with other measures, achieving the scale of terrestrial emissions reductions mandated by the IPCC and accepted by the CoP (Streck, 2011). A REDD+ component within the global climate agreement that effectively builds linkages (market-based and otherwise) between the public and private sectors can be the key to unlocking or re-directing capital away from environmentally and socially damaging business-as-usual practices and towards climate- and forest-friendly investment, ultimately trans-forming frontier economics by providing gov-
6  For instance, underwriting mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs or advanced-market commitments (“AMCs”) are increasingly seen as efficient ways to catalyse private investment in REDD+ in the run-up to a global agreement. See Work Stream 7 of the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing. 
Public and private investment could collaborate in any one or more of the following vehicles: a UNFCCC-led global REDD+ market as part of the NMM/FVA; one or more REDD+ bonds; a dedicated REDD+ window under the Green Climate Fund; and/or domestically defined elements of REDD+ achievements
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ernance frameworks and economic signals that prioritise sustainability right down to the lowest unit of economic production, and in so doing also set the stage for other environmental and social benefits such as protection of flagship species and betterment of community livelihoods to accrue (Dinerstein et al 2013). 
robust mrv and environmental  and social safeguards
The encouragement of sustained and stable fi-nancing (both private and public) for REDD+ will depend on the credibility of the technical underpinnings, namely the development of ro-bust MRV and the strong environmental and social safeguards that will inform its integrity as an asset class. There is agreement that a REDD+ mechanism will only succeed if it is sustained over time and represents a viable pathway to economic improvement for forest countries and their local communities. Social and environmental ‘deliver-ables’ that would be incorporated into safeguards include:
•  Transparent and effective national forest gov-ernance structures; •  Effective participation by relevant stakeholders; •  Respect for the knowledge and rights of indig-enous peoples and local communities;•  The conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services and biological diversity.
The encouraging news is that, along with the progress made by the CoP, a number of actions are being taken now (see Case Studies text box) through multilateral, national, subnational and early voluntary measures that are beginning to address the challenge of developing appropriate safeguards with a sense of urgency. For instance, the Verified Carbon Standard developed a Juris-
dictional and Nested REDD+ Initiative (JNR)7 that includes an accounting and crediting frame-work for use by governmental entities and pro-jects that are integrated through a process known as “nesting” within the jurisdictional programme. The World Resources Institute is developing a for-est initiative that will allow meaningful, real-time tracking of forestry activities around the world. As described in further detail below, California is also considering MRV and safeguards issues relat-ed to the inclusion of REDD+ in its compliance cap-and-trade programme.
These measures and others can serve as valuable tools, as they are being developed and implement-ed now in advance of the global REDD+ mecha-nism. With a carefully coordinated REDD+ mech-anism that recognizes such early action, they can be further scaled up prior to 2020. This would provide a critical proving ground for the future REDD+ mechanism and help to discern practi-cal lessons that can be applied at scale under the post-2020 regime. A mutual recognition of glob-al best practices on MRV and safeguards being developed within the UNFCCC and outside the UNFCCC is critical to arriving at a broadly agreed set of standards that is recognized by UNFCCC, even if not created solely by it.
7  The JNR Framework (http://v-c-s.org/JNRI) provides detailed guidance for the development of national and subnational REDD+ programmes, including how activities at multiple scales can be effectively integrated, advancing readiness for participation in any forthcoming UNFCCC frame-work. Applying the JNR Requirements may serve to inform countries about operationalizing results-based REDD+ under voluntary, bi- or multi-lateral REDD+ efforts, the UNFCCC or another regulatory programme.
California is also considering MRV and safeguards issues related to the inclusion of REDD+ in its compliance cap-and-trade programme
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If REDD+ is to deliver the outcomes envisaged by the “Durbin Platform for Enhanced Action” and previous CoP decisions, it is vital that the REDD+ component of a global climate agreement is underpinned by governance and decision-making that are ‘fit for purpose’. Ensuring the efficacy of this apparatus will have direct impacts on the rigour of MRV and carbon accounting (and thus leakage avoidance), as well as the degree to which non-carbon elements of forest management and conservation are made explicit and enhanced. The method and rigour associated with governance directly inform the level of integrity of assets generated by REDD+. In other words, will it be possible to have reasonable confidence that a tonne of REDD+ physically equals the actual avoidance of a tonne of greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere through deforestation or degradation?8 Similarly, will it also be explicit that that same tonne carries with it imbedded ‘deliverables’ associat-ed with biodiversity conservation and social improvement in host countries? 
Such confidence in the integrity of REDD+ has obvious signif-icance for all stakeholders involved: government policy-makers, investors and the private sector in forest communities and the global society generally. Therefore the next question is how best to structure and launch a REDD+ mechanism that will ensure the highest possible degree of integrity whilst at the same time re-maining inclusive and having relevance for as much of the global forest estate9 as possible. The diagram below depicts a simple typology assuming three scenarios defined as: (1) Non-UNFCCC 
8 Or the sequestration of a tonne of CO2 from the atmosphere in the case of regeneration, reforestation or afforestation activities.9 And ultimately other land use and ecosystem-types. REDD+ will be an important template for approaches to conserving and improving the management of marine (e.g. mangrove) systems, savannahs and agricultur-al production systems.
REDD+ programmes; (2) CoP ‘Lite’; and (3) ‘Strong Global Stand-ard’. In Scenario 1, REDD+ mechanisms continue to develop on the voluntary and subnational levels (e.g., VCS Jurisdictional Nested REDD approach and California cap-and-trade programme). Local impacts can be significantly positive, and MRV and safeguards may be as protective as a UNFCCC-created REDD+ mechanism. If subnational programmes are appropriately linked and MRV and safeguards harmonized, significant scale can be achieved. However, the stringency of MRV and safeguards and harmonization across jurisdictions and programmes is not guaranteed, as there is no overarching, global framework. In Scenario 2, a REDD Mechanism launched by the CoP with weaker centralized control over such vitally important aspects like MRV and safeguards for non-carbon benefits leads to a ‘balkanized’ REDD+ world and ultimately a lower level of confidence that one ‘unit’ of REDD+ (or a given national REDD+ programme) is as efficacious as another. In Scenario 3, while there is necessarily the drawback that REDD+ countries will ‘come online’ only when they are ready to meet CoP-defined and -governed parameters, REDD+ will be an asset with the benefit of the highest possible integrity, and with internationally accepted stringency on carbon accounting and non-carbon benefits and safeguards pertaining to biodiversity and forest people. A design based upon Scenario 3 should still allow for significant deci-sion-making at the national level (e.g. related to finance sources, reference levels and implementation activities) but the criteria for their eligibility under the REDD+ mechanism will be managed and reviewed by the CoP and its appointed bodies.
GOVERNANCE AND DECISION-MAKING AS A DETERMINANT OF REDD+ “ASSET INTEGRITY”
GtCO≤e/yr Global emi
(1) Non-UNFCCC REDD+ Programs• Fragmented national, subnational and voluntary schemes• Safeguards, MRV (and impacts) vary across and within geographies and sectors• Weakest relative availability of finance• Benefits for climate, biodiversity and development at global level are greatly reduced(Note: Fragmentation can be mitigated and scale enhanced if programs linked by common set of safeguards and MRV)
(2) “COP-Lite”• COP body sets criteria for issuance of REDD+ credits • Criteria interpreted and implemented at national level• Safeguards and MRV are the remit of host country• Limited controls on REDD+ assets entering into    ‘circulation’
(3) Strong Global Standard• COP dictates rigorous MRV and safeguards as key    eligibility criteria• Initial ‘barrier to entry’ for certain countries, but    capacity building in countries with greatest need to   aid move  towards results-based payments• Greatest flow of finance; climate, biodiversity and    development benefits maximised
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Greater collaboration and information-sharing of best practices among the UNFCCC process, multi-lateral institutions, voluntary standards, national and sub-national efforts and the private sector is essential to leverage the best ideas, encourage the best actions and define those measures that can be acceptable within the context of a UN-FCCC REDD+ mechanism. Clearly, not all early actions can or should be recognized under a fu-ture REDD+ mechanism. There are certain early measures that will not withstand the appropriate scrutiny required by the global REDD+ mech-anism. But a process that seeks to define those boundaries now and that sends a positive sig-nal to early actors can help guide actions on the ground today that will serve to bridge the policy gap until 2020.
The development of robust MRV and safeguards is important for the UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism, as well as other programmes under consideration that may not be capable of developing their own MRV and safeguard standards. For instance, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – the UN body that regulates aviation – is consid-ering global market-based measures (MBMs) as a potential means by which to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the aviation sector. The EC’s decision in 2012 to delay the inclusion of aviation in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme to provide ICAO additional time to propose an al-ternative means to address aviation emissions un-der a global agreement has forced the issue within ICAO. MBMs under consideration include a global offsetting system, emissions-related charges and a global cap-and-trade programme. Thus far, there has been little formal mention of REDD+ within these discussions, but ICAO, which lacks its own internal technical expertise on forestry MRV and safeguards, could incorporate the UNFCCC MRV and safeguards approach in a fashion similar to the recommendations of the REDD Offsets Work-
ing Group (ROW) for CA to enable REDD+ credits from eligible activities to be acceptable offsets by ICAO. Similarly, a number of national-level cap-and-trade and climate-change programmes and approaches are emerging, including in China, South Korea, Mexico, Australia, Japan and other ‘PMR countries’.10 These “bottom-up” approaches will have profound influences on a 2015 Agree-ment, and they highlight the need for the CoP to collaborate in the development of standards for MRV and safeguards that could be incorporated within these regimes to create both an aggregated scale of demand for private investment in REDD+ and consistency across regimes to ensure environ-mental and market integrity.
the need for a Prompt start 
The CoP has already achieved notable successes in establishing “prompt start” mechanisms to en-courage early private-sector involvement in policy markets prior to their formally effective dates. The CDM prompt start mechanism is perhaps the best example. With defined MRV and safeguards, the CoP could formally recognize, prior to 2020, cred-ible REDD+ activities that adhere to such MRV and safeguard standards. With approximately 13 million hectares lost each year on a net basis, the world’s forests cannot wait until 2020, and trans-forming the global economic relationship with our forests will take time to ramp up. Today, at a time when most land-use models plainly do not 
10  The Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) is a grant-based, capac-ity-building trust fund that provides funding and technical assistance for the collective innovation and piloting of market-based instruments for greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The Partnership brings together developed and developing countries, as well as other key experts and stakeholders, in order to provide a platform for technical discussions on market instruments, foster South-South exchange, facilitate collective innovation for pilot efforts, and harness financial flows for implementation and scale-up. In 2012, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) launched a new “Business Partnership for Market Readiness” – or “B- PMR” – to meet these new challenges, aiming to enhance the poten-tial for workable international climate-focussed trading models to emerge around the world. IETA will work in concert with host governments, the World Bank and PMR donor countries on this initiative.
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seeds of Demand: california’s Pre-compliance  reDD+ activities
California is generally at the cutting edge of environmental policy, and its consideration of REDD+ in its compliance cap-and-trade programme is no exception. Sector-based credits from REDD+ ac-tivities are authorized in the California cap-and-trade programme regulations, but no sectoral programmes have yet been approved. California is the largest North American carbon market and the second largest market in the world to date. The significance of the California sectoral REDD+ programme is that the California regulators are currently in the process of considering how such a programme will work, and it may become the first such programme designed in the context of a compliance regime. The level of de-mand created by the California programme will not be sufficient to move the needle on the challenge of attracting scaled finance, but it can serve as an important template for other emerging domestic regimes, especially in the area of safeguards. To the extent a 2015 Agreement takes the form of a flexible approach that encourages ambitious domestic actions, the California programme could be a very important catalyst for driving similar domestic actions, the aggregated effect of which could yield meaningful scale. 
The REDD+ Offset Working Group (ROW), comprised of a group of technical REDD+ experts, has convened to develop recommen-dations to inform the use of REDD+ credits in the California cap-and-trade programme. The ROW was established in 2011 as a re-sult of a November 2010 Memorandum of Understanding between the Governors of California, Chiapas and Acre to collaborate on a REDD+ policy. In January 2013, the ROW released its long-awaited recommendations on how to incorporate REDD+ activities in the California market. Among other recommendations, the ROW ad-vocated the use of high-quality safeguards to generate additional social and environmental benefits from REDD+ projects and poli-cies along with greenhouse gas reductions. The ROW recognized the usefulness of the UNFCCC’s work on safeguards in particular. It also recommended that the UNFCCC REDD+ safeguards set forth in the Cancun CoP decision Annex 1(including the enhanced benefit approach), the guidance on safeguard information systems in UNFCCC 12/CP.17 and future safeguards developments under the UNFCCC should be a condition of any jurisdictional REDD programme that California links up to and approves. The recogni-tion of the UNFCCC work on safeguards highlights the credibility of the UNFCCC process in subnational programmes. 
California’s actions relating to REDD+ sector-based credits gen-erated from REDD+ activities in Acre and Chiapas promise to be precedent-setting. ROW recommendations and the consideration of REDD+ credits on the regulatory front are likely to be influenced by the UNFCCC progress on MRV and safeguards, and the inter-national process is likely to be informed by California as one of 
the first uses of REDD+ credits in a compliance regime. This model of two-way information-sharing and potential mutual recognition may have some valuable lessons for part of the ultimate UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism.
Progression on reDD+ mrv and non-carbon benefits at the jurisdictional level 
Developments outside the formal scope of the UNFCCC are pro-viding exciting and relevant illustrations of what a global REDD+ mechanism makes possible. These ‘bottom-up’ subnational and national initiatives have much to offer to the international pro-cess, including local credibility, momentum and technical profi-ciency. The state of Acre in Brazil is moving to become the first jurisdiction-wide programme to deliver compliance-grade REDD+ credits. Germany (via KfW) recently agreed to performance-based payments worth USD $25 million, which Acre plans to deliver via the JNR Framework. Acre is actively working with local and inter-national private-sector specialists and finance sources, and also has an MoU with the State of California to provide a pathway for its early participation in California’s cap-and-trade system. The ‘signal’ provided by this MoU has provided much of the momentum necessary to drive the developments inside Acre. In June 2012, VCS signed an agreement with Acre’s Institute of Climate Change and Regulation of Environmental Services (IMC) to outline JNR pilot activities. IMC has established a working group where VCS is partnering the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) and other organizations to provide technical guidance to the de-velopment of Acre’s jurisdictional REDD+ programme, in line with the JNR Requirements. Acre is also member of the Governors’ Cli-mate and Forest Taskforce. Elsewhere, last year Costa Rica, through its National Fund for Financing Forestry (FONAFIFO), became the latest national government to move toward piloting JNR guidelines, and VCS also signed or has pending similar agreements with Chile and other jurisdictions (see- http://v-c-s.org/news-events/news/costa-rica-joins-growing-list-nations-pilot-jnr-program).
Jurisdictional developments for non-carbon deliverables and safe-guards are also advancing rapidly, led by NGOs, host countries and the private sector. The REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards initiative aims to define and build support for a higher level of social and environmental performance from REDD+ programmes, is designed for government-led policies and measures implemented at national, state, provincial or other level, and is relevant for all forms of financing. The Standards were developed through ex-tensive consultations to define the high social and environmental performance of jurisdictional programmes and provide a compre-hensive framework of key issues and elements of quality that can be used consistently across countries while enabling specific tailoring to the country context. 
case stUDies
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The host-country governments, ministries and departments that have to date elected to include subnational initiatives such as those described above would derive benefit from explicit signals from the CoP that these programmes will have the potential to be integrated into a future UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism as part of nationally appropriate measures and actions. 
capturing and scaling-up project-level achievements:  cordillera azul national Park reDD+ Project example: robust mrv and safeguards in action 
The Cordillera Azul National Park REDD+ project completed vali-dation and verification against the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and gold validation against the Climate, Community and Biodi-versity Standard in February 2013. The project is registered on the VCS database, with 5.7 million credits spanning 2008–2012 ready to be issued. The range of climate, social and local benefits that are accruing provides a helpful illustration of the power of the technical developments and lessons learned at the project level which have great relevance to the deployment of REDD+ at the jurisdictional level.
The project avoids deforestation in a magnificent expanse of lowland and montane forests in four departments in central Peru. Approximately 180,000 people in more than 200 communities – immigrant and indigenous – neighbour the park. The forests harbours an astounding diversity of plants and animals, including many rare, endangered and range-restricted species. The natural resources in Cordillera Azul are crucial to the well-being of nearby villagers. The project area protects the entire watersheds of the two main tributaries in the Peruvian Amazon – the Huallaga and Ucayali – as well as large systems of wetlands that include vast palm swamps and an unusual highland swamp.
The project avoids deforestation in Cordillera Azul by strengthen-ing the park’s protection infrastructure, engaging local communi-ties and other stakeholders in land-use management compatible with conservation, and improving the quality of life of neighbour-ing villagers. These efforts reduce the pressures caused by the primary drivers of deforestation in the area: an advancing agri-cultural frontier, new roads, large-scale agriculture, and mineral and oil exploration. Collaborations with the park’s neighbours and local governments are resulting in land-use stabilization, ecologi-cal and economic zoning, and conservation-compatible activities spearheaded by the local communities to improve their quality of life, from the sale of handicrafts to water sanitation. The project’s environmental education in the buffer zone reaches thousands of schoolchildren and trains hundreds of teachers and volunteers.
case stUDies
Indigenous communities neighbouring the park are developing quality-of-life plans that empower them to identify priorities based on their own cultural values and traditions. This assets-based con-servation model is strongly supported by local governments and is gaining momentum in the region.
In Peru, where the government is committed to meeting a goal of zero net emissions in the land-use sector by 2021 (partly through the conservation of 54 million hectares of primary forest), this project is highly relevant to the national strategy. Many regions in Peru are in the initial phases of preparing REDD+ programmes. The departments of San Martin and Madre de Dios are devel-oping jurisdiction-wide baselines and working alongside several NGOs in the regions to coordinate participatory processes. VCS is working with both national and regional governments, and part-nering to help apply the flexible, phased approach of JNR to the development and eventual validation and registration of cohesive and transparent jurisdictional REDD+ baselines and programmes. 
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factor in REDD+, and the ‘serious capital’ driv-ing resource utilisation at scale is often unaware even of its existence, the need for a prompt start mechanism could not be more acute. Concerns over permanence and leakage in the context of a 
REDD+ prompt start mechanism are legitimate, but, as demonstrated by VCS JNR, they are en-tirely surmountable. As countries develop and/or private actors implement adequate MRV and safe-guards in connection with their pre-2020 REDD+ activities, those actions should be rewarded. To do otherwise would send a perverse policy signal that early positive actions are discouraged, and sovereigns and the private sector should contin-ue the status quo of unsustainable destruction of our forests.
recommendations
In the context of the above, we offer the following recommendations to the COP in its consideration of its REDD+ work programme for the develop-ment of a REDD+ mechanism:
•	 	Recognize the Role of Private Finance to Scale Up the Necessary Financing
On a global basis, both market-based and non-market-based approaches to REDD+ are needed, and neither need be threatened or superseded 
by the other. The framework must allow for sov-ereign decisions taken locally to determine the appropriate blend that is required at the given na-tional or subnational level. To foster the greatest possible range of funding, a REDD+ mechanism should leverage scarce public-sector finance to attract greater private-sector finance while both respecting national sovereignty and maintain-ing a “race to the top” in terms of best practic-es. With a combined approach, the market-based component can be robust and rigorous, while the non-market based approach can help to advance country readiness for those who wish to partici-pate in such markets (which would be an “opt in” provided certain basis conditions were met, not mandated participation). 
•  Collaborate with non-UNFCCC actors on the Development of Robust MRV and Safeguards 
While any operational global REDD+ programme under the UNFCCC process is years away, there is an opportunity in the interim for the UNFCCC to develop a set of harmonized rules to provide a consistent approach to measuring and verifying reductions related to REDD+. A UNFCCC-ap-proved set of MRV and safeguards (definition and reporting) standards would provide a com-mon “language” that REDD+ projects in any juris-diction or industry-based regime, such as ICAO, could use. If and when an international REDD+ market is established, a common standard would ease the transition to a global regime. In the development of robust MRV and safeguards, we recommend that UNFCCC policy-makers embrace collaboration with non-UNFCCC actors to emerge with a truly informed global set of best practices that allow for mutual recognition. 
•	 	Create a Formal Prompt Start Mechanism for Approved REDD+ Actions
The development of robust MRV and safeguards is important for the UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism, as well as other programmes under consideration that may not be capable of developing their own MRV and safeguard standards
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The CoP should encourage the role of private fi-nance in REDD+ activities to date by recognizing existing REDD+ efforts as “early action” projects in any future global REDD+ mechanism. To lose the accumulated knowledge and skill of early REDD+ investors and project participants would hinder the success of any global mechanism, as these actors have real on-the-ground experi-ence with REDD+ activities. Recognition of early REDD+ efforts would ensure continued interest by national governments and private (and public entities) in forest conservation and sustainable utilisation while a global REDD+ programme is under development.
Success in these three areas is vital to ensure that the integrity of REDD+ as an asset is sufficient to attract sustainable financing over the long term, as well as achieving the needed outcomes for climate, rural development and biodiversity conservation. 
conclusion
There remains great potential for a UNFCCC-cre-ated REDD+ mechanism to attract the scale of long-term investment from public and private sources necessary to address the deforestation crisis. We encourage the COP to establish a formal prompt start programme for REDD+ activities to encourage early investments in REDD+ and also to collaborate with national, sub-national and voluntary regimes on harmonized MRV and safe-guards in order to ensure the highest degree of integrity for REDD+ at all levels.
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  abstractThe UNFCCC places responsibility for the reduction of historical emis-sions on Annex 1 Parties, but there is a shared appreciation of the role of non-Annex 1 Parties in changing local policies to limit future emissions while addressing issues of climate change adaptation. In addition the bringing together of global economies through trade reduces the possibil-ity of Africa being immune from the responsibility for reducing emissions. Carbon emission reduction is now an economic issue which is important for all technology and development decisions. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions could link local and global priorities and help bridge the commitments gap in the climate change debate. Defining and imple-menting NAMAs can help mobilize public- and private-sector resources to achieve local development goals whilst addressing current and future greenhouse gas emissions. This paper will indicate areas of development priority in Southern Africa and show how a new climate agreement can incorporate policies to respond to the impacts of climate change while being more sensitive to the needs of Southern Africa. 
Norbert NziramasangaIndependent energy  and environment consultant  from Zimbabwe
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introduction
Africa presents a unique scenario regarding cli-mate change mitigation. Emission avoidance is a more reasonable approach than emission reduc-tion since current emission levels are relatively low. Low consumption levels are limiting human security, especially where food production is still of subsistence type and industrial production is too low to build a buffer against climate change. The usual approaches to climate change mitiga-tion have mostly failed to meet the political need to address climate change, and financing instru-ments have performed poorly in Africa.
The current debate on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions or NAMAs offers a possible approach for Africa in addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation. NAMAs need to be as-sessed in a more regionally specific approach that captures the Africa’s unique demands. The first commitment period emphasized project-based mechanisms that emphasized quantified emission reductions without an emphasis on accelerating market penetration of the applied technologies. The issue in Africa is future emissions coming from a very unclear baseline.
This paper reviews development priorities in Southern Africa and examines how climate change mitigation initiatives have so far failed to align with development objectives. The gap be-tween local and global objectives is mostly due to approaches to technical project appraisal that have missed out on the opportunities to integrate climate change mitigation and development. The 
paper suggests ways to evaluate NAMAs using a less burdensome approach that ensures accel-erated migration to cleaner technologies whilst accommodating a region with limited capacity to monitor and evaluate small and diffuse projects.
The paper starts by discussing regional climate change and the development context. It then re-views the regional experience with climate change interventions with reference to the Global Envi-ronment Facility and the Clean Development Mechanism. The paper then makes recommen-dations for implementing NAMAs with pointers to how a future climate agreement can define commitments.
the climate change context  in southern africa
In the context of this paper Southern Africa is defined as the region covered by the Southern Africa Development Community, or SADC. There are linkages with neighbouring countries in East Africa that allow for use of some of their experi-ences in this regional context.
Southern Africa is highly dependent on agricul-ture, hence the impact of frequent droughts is often used to define climate change. Southern Af-rica is also dependent on hydroelectricity, hence the energy sector is sensitive to reduced precipi-tation. The regional economy is dominated by the exploitation of natural resources in the forms of minerals, soils and water for agriculture, and also various forms of tourism. The wide range of miner-als and the focus placed by regional governments on food security and poverty reduction all require awareness of the potential for climate change as a major hazard. 
The issue in Africa is future emissions coming from a very unclear baseline.
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emissions and DriversAccording to a UNFCCC report (UNFCCC SBI, 2005), total greenhouse gas emissions in Southern Africa are 1202 Tg per year (1990 baseline). The IEA estimates emissions from energy combustion in Southern Africa to have been 393.9 Gg per year in 2010 (IEA, 2010). Most countries have yet to submit their official estimates for 2000. Accord-ing to the UNFCCC 1990 data, the distribution of emissions is energy use 37%, agriculture 14.53%, land use 56.96% and industry 3.75%. Southern Africa is responsible for 80.02% of greenhouse gas emissions in Africa and is therefore a natu-ral target for interventions to reduce emissions. Even though most of the emissions are from fuel combustion, key drivers lie in industrial technol-ogies being outdated. The policies that are ap-plied are reluctant to impose sufficient pressure for the adoption of more up to date technologies, among the reasons being poor awareness and per-ceived market risk. Carbon emissions per unit of production are therefore high compared to de-veloped countries, and destruction of the natural environment exposes the regional economies to the threats of climate change. When faced by eco-nomic threats, rural communities tend to turn to the unsustainable harvesting of natural resources as a way to meet the challenges. Charcoal produc-tion, the poaching of wild life and the use of fire in accessing honey are some of the methods used.
climate impactsThe majority of the population in Southern Africa lives in the rural areas, but migration to urban ar-eas continues to pose the challenge of increased urban poverty, as urban economies have not grown sufficiently to support large-scale formal urban employment. With high poverty levels food security is dependent on sustaining subsistence systems that are simple and vulnerable to climate change as much as they themselves drive the cli-mate to change. 
Disease vectors like mosquitoes and house flies are tending to increase with the expected climate regime in Southern Africa (IPCC TAR, 2001). Clean water is expected to become scarce, and ground water which would otherwise be cleaner 
is affected by poor agriculture, mining and other production practices or is not accessible due to a lack of appropriate energy. Recent cases of chol-era in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique are linked to poor urban water supplies. Other poten-tial threats such as Rift Valley fever and meningitis are also set to worsen with a changing climate.
The impacts of climate change in Southern Afri-ca provide a positive feedback to greenhouse gas emissions. The definition of climate change mit-igation is therefore broader than the reduction of emissions through project-based interventions and needs to include livelihood security. This is more apparent when the responses of rural com-munities to impacts of climate change include the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources.
the Development context  in southern africa
Government has traditionally been the major force behind development in Southern Africa but there is now a growing understanding of the need for large-scale industry to play a role in develop-ment, as this would secure markets and provide the local skills necessary for their competitive-ness. 
Even though most of the emissions are from fuel combustion, key drivers lie in industrial technologies being outdated
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mDgsSouthern African countries embraced the Millen-nium Development Goals and have set national targets to achieve them. Priority is placed on poverty reduction, health, education and gender equality, as these issues are motivated by histori-cal experiences in the region. All MDG goals are, however, interrelated, and achieving one directly influences achieving the others. Evaluations show that most countries will not meet their MDG tar-gets by the agreed dates. The major reasons for 
this are a lack of resources and fundamentally the poor economic base with which to achieve these ambitious goals. Development assistance has a role to play in building the basis for achieving the development targets. 
the Private sector in DevelopmentThe private sector recognises the role it needs to play in social development, even though leader-ship is still being left to government. Corporate social responsibility, the reduction of environ-mental footprints, continuous quality improve-ments and energy management are all concepts that are voluntarily applied by the private sector to reduce costs and improve its image. Experience has shown that industry in Southern Africa has implemented some creative solutions to develop-ment problems, but there is still room for incen-tives to encourage market penetration of these solutions to achieve cost reductions and build 
confidence in the opportunities on offer. As an example, off-grid electricity has been produced by sugar mills and some small hydro-installations, while ethanol has been used for transport. Large-scale renewable energy has not received sufficient policy attention to enable greater market pene-tration.
mitigation and adaptation co-benefitsAdapting to climate change creates co-benefits in climate change mitigation. The ability to adapt is dependent on how communities apply new meth-ods for livelihoods and how they establish and respond to early warning systems. In the absence of requisite skills and resources for preparedness, first responses are typically by emergency systems where the loss has already occurred. Even private companies that are present in remote areas end up offering emergency services at a higher cost to them than would be the case if they offered early warning support services. In eastern Zim-babwe some timber companies have integrated rural communities into the fire detection system. They do this on a fee for service basis, but the prevention of fires has a benefit for both the tim-ber companies and the rural communities. Such a response system can form the nucleus for de-velopment projects that include communities that benefit from sustainable non-timber forest products. Climate change impacts are naturally going to lead to increased conflict as communi-ties move out of their areas in search of resources and ecosystem productivity falls below demand level. The early establishment of mechanisms for cooperation will help build lessons for minimizing such conflicts. 
climate change mitigation Priorities  in southern africa
Southern African economies are based on natu-ral resource extraction and use. Awareness of the 
The definition of climate change mitigation is therefore broader than the reduction of emissions through project-based interventions and needs to include livelihood security
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impact of the climate on the economy is there-fore an essential part of regional security. Rain-fall decreases as one moves away from the equa-tor or the Indian Ocean, hence countries in the south are characterised by dry, sandy and desert conditions. The Kalahari and Namib deserts are the dominant features of Botswana and Namibia. Increased awareness of the impact of fossil fuel use on climate has also raised concerns about the future of economic development in South-ern Africa as the bulk of energy comes from coal and petroleum fuels. Renewable energy has long been viewed as an option to replace imported fu-els, but the available technologies do not offer a competitive option to meet the needs for min-ing, agriculture and agro-processing, which are the mainstays of these economies. The emphasis has therefore been placed on the adoption of re-newable energy technologies to meet the ener-gy needs of lower income groups or small-scale energy users. That in itself carries the huge bur-den of market development that most renewable energy technology suppliers are not equipped to deliver. The traditional money market perceives the small-scale energy market as high risk. Pub-lic-sector funding, which is applied as policy in-centives as well as development assistance, brings with it market distortions and a huge administra-tive burden. In addition, small-scale energy-us-ers in the form of small-scale agriculture, rural trading and community organisations are often operating on the margins of the mainstream econ-omy. These energy-users are vulnerable to every disturbance in the mainstream economy and are fully exposed to climate variability. They rely on a weak subsistence market with seasonal revenues and are highly dependent on remittances from those working outside their communities. There is therefore a great variety of failed renewable energy interventions. Lessons learnt from these interventions form a good basis for current and future projects, mostly due to competition from 
other needs at the community level. An example is the GEF PV pilot project being implemented in Zimbabwe. The objective of installing 9000 so-lar home systems was largely met, but the market distortions imbedded in the project such as duty exemptions for project equipment, financing us-ers and not suppliers, and the large number of suppliers and installers with no future market and a disproportionately large administrative budget destroyed the underlying market.
The UNDP FINESSE, Financing Energy for Small Scale Energy Users, was implemented in South-ern Africa as a follow on to the implementation of similar activities in Asia. The main objective of the project was to identify business opportunities for small-scale renewable-energy and energy-effi-ciency businesses and assist with the development of business plans. The project systematically failed the challenge to develop business plans essential-ly because the expected sponsors did not have a high enough credit rating and because financial institutions have limited experience with small-scale energy projects.
Similarly energy interventions have failed to sus-tain themselves because of low incomes and com-petition from higher return short-term options. Even in industry, energy efficiency or cleaner production interventions fail to reach the desired 
Renewable energy has long been viewed as an option to replace imported fuels, but the available technologies do not offer a competitive option to meet the needs for mining, agriculture and agro-processing, which are the mainstays of these economies
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market penetration because policies are tilted to-wards job creation, and the economic environ-ment is not easily predictable.
A lesson learnt from energy and climate change interventions in the region is that linking energy to production is essential for project sustainabil-ity. As a result, the involvement of the private sec-tor in such projects is increasingly being given a higher priority. The Global Environment Facility has provided support to climate change projects in the region. There is increasing appreciation of the value of the GEF programs, especially where private-sector collaboration with communities is prioritized. The GEF Small Grants Program of-fers valuable support in this area as the program can manage small-scale projects that interface with larger commercial activities. The challenge with the larger GEF interventions continues to be limited resources when compared to the tar-get sectors and insufficient capacity to manage the transaction costs related to the identifica-tion and establishment of the GEF component. Mainstream private-sector investments tend to move quietly during conception and once past feasibility stage move very quickly to investment, whilst the GEF component requires the feasibil-ity stage to be revisited to establish incremental benefits and a long uncertain commitment period with processes that are mostly foreign to private investors in the region. Regional experience with the Clean Development Mechanism is similar. The majority of CDM projects that are identified are on a small scale with minimal commercial pro-duction, while the larger, more successful projects are linked to the commercialisation of research, as with the landfill gas projects in South Africa. Even though some public-sector projects were mostly successful, the level of transaction costs or perceived risks would not have been amenable to private-sector investment. The monitoring and 
Source: GEF, OPS4 Learning Product, 2009.
Source: UNEP Risoe, Capacity Development for the CDM, June 2012
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validation of numerous small-scale CDM projects increases the costs of delivering carbon credits.
Since inception the GEF has faced challenges in achieving the desired levels of awareness for projects to flow from the private sector in south-ern Africa. Most GEF project proposals originate in the public sector and non-governmental de-velopment agencies. The shortcomings of such projects include low levels of underlying finance and unclear project baselines. The sustainability of projects once the development phase has been completed has also been a challenge. Despite the implementation of a revised approach to resource allocation, the quantity of GEF projects in Africa continues to be low. The volume of resources is too low to match the more attractive conventional power-sector investments such as power genera-tion technology upgrades and capacity-building for technology innovation and management. Im-plementing agents tend to lean towards social development projects where social development objectives provide the justification for the incre-mental cost of climate change mitigation. This is attributable to the preference on the part of the National GEF Focal Points to support otherwise poorly resourced interventions with high pover-ty-reduction co-benefits. These are also the areas for which the capacity is available in government and non-governmental agencies to develop such projects through the GEF cycle. The Coping with Drought and climate change project recent-ly implemented in Zimbabwe and Mozambique has achieved some good results for both climate change adaptation and mitigation. Increased appreciation of the key issues and building the confidence of communities in improving and ex-panding their traditional coping strategies have also enabled much lower cost interventions en-couraging community participation.
mainstreaming namas into Public-  and Private-sector investmentIn its fifth cycle the GEF has introduced the con-cept of National Portfolio Formulation, where countries develop a priority list of projects or project areas for funding. Even though the doc-ument would be valuable for other investors and should indeed be focussed at more than GEF, the countries tend to address this as a fulfilment of the requirements for GEF support. Climate change issues are still treated as environmental issues with weak participation by the major play-ers in economic development. Both ministries for economic development and the private sector are trailing behind in terms of information and lead-ership in integrating climate change issues into mainstream development planning. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development, WBCSD, has network partners in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and has an inter-est in progressing climate change mitigation. In South Africa members of the National Business Initiative or NBI have implemented measures that include water recycling at corporate offices, the replacement of incandescent lamps in mines with more efficient compact fluorescent lamps and the installation of variable speed drives for industri-al and commercial machines. Local industry also supplies the devices and systems that are used to mitigate climate change, hence they have an in-terest in developing the technology market. At the global level the WBCSD has funded development of the Carbon Footprint Protocol in collaboration with the World Resources Institute or WRI. The protocol provides a popular reference for those entities that are embarking on greenhouse gas emissions. The involvement of the private sector in developing and implementing interventions not only leverages additional resources but helps in crafting methods that use analytical “language” that is familiar to private business. WBCSD is ac-tively participating in the debate on the imple-
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mentation of NAMAs, which can be viewed as a way to bridge the differences in the political ne-gotiations on mitigation. Historically mitigation actions have carried some developmental co-ben-efits apart from earning carbon credits. NAMAs would include projects where there are knowledge barriers, a lack of capital and short lead times but which are not readily recognised as competing alternatives when plans are made to invest in new plant or to carry out major maintenance. “Low hanging fruit”, that is, those projects where low-cost decisions are all that is needed, can achieve mitigation benefits if incremental funding is made available at the same time. The challenge appears to be little or no coordination between government and the private sector in planning technology improvements. Large companies tend to plan and implement projects, especially where no permits are required, without checking on na-tional preferences for technologies except where the options have been publicised. Utilities and other service providers who are public-sector entities involved in implementation of the pro-jects tend to be isolated from the climate change debate that environmental ministries are mostly 
involved in. Examples are companies investing in commercial buildings where passive cooling or other such options are not included in the design despite their potential benefits. If local building codes or standards included energy efficiency and emission reduction criteria, there would be increased opportunities to include interventions in the investment stage. If technology suppliers could receive climate change mitigation financ-ing as a rebate, there could be an easier process in terms of project identification. An industrial company buying energy equipment would auto-matically receive an invitation to access climate change funding upon being requested for quo-tations, thereby eliminating the need for a sepa-rate climate change mitigation initiative having to identify projects separately. A regional technology greenhouse gas emission baseline would support this type of initiative.
Emission reductions in Africa are mostly based on the avoidance of future emissions since cur-rent levels are low. It is widely accepted that re-ductions in poverty or improvements in econom-ic standing give rise to increased consumption. 
intervention Description evidence
Efficient transport Use of cleaner fuels and development of more efficient modes to suit road and rail networks. Traffic congestion is common and unsafe passenger transport is a scourge for all countries.Renewable energy Adoption of energy solutions for urban and rural areas. Grid extension is not a viable option for all. Even with grid-based rural electrification there are households and other entities whose energy needs cannot be met by a power line a few kilometres away. Standby diesel power is commonly used against grid-connected hydro. Management of forest fires Savannah fires are common. Land use management and early warning can help reduce fires. In most countries fires are increasing, and potential conflict between landowners is always a risk. Some commercial forests are applying community management practices with reasonable success.
table 1. Potential namas for regional countries
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Some small-scale interventions may not lead to a reduction in emissions as the beneficiaries may end up emitting more through the consumption of other goods and services. However, the same beneficiaries would stand a better chance of man-aging extreme events. A bigger market for cleaner technologies will also advance market penetration in all sectors and bring forward the date of the next intervention. This is the role that the GEF PV pilot project in Zimbabwe played successfully. The increased awareness brought into play a new type of solar PV systems user with small and non-stand-ard but working installations. The expected mar-ket of private finance and formal technology sup-pliers did not sustain itself but was replaced by a stronger market of informal traders despite their lack of standardisation and business efficiency. The more formal solar PV market continues to ex-ist, its target being institutions and high-income households. 
insights for a new climate agreement
The early days of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change were focussed on understanding the science and the potential im-pacts of climate change. The major gap in Africa at this stage of assessing the response measures was the limited involvement of the private sector in the planning process. The political debate on responsibility and equity overshadowed the need to identify synergies between climate change mit-igation, adaptation and the development of econ-omies in marginal nations. The pressure imposed by the deadlines of the first commitment period was essential to generate momentum and increase the benefits of early action. However, there was still a void in terms of steps to address the slower pace of actions by developing countries which may not have had the capacity or need to imple-ment mitigation actions, but which will definite-ly need to commence building the capacity and 
skills to match the new trend in global technology that seeks to achieve lower carbon emissions in the business as usual development scenario. 
considering analytical methodsThe definition of the incremental costs of emis-sion reductions needs to change to accommodate the situation in Africa. In simple terms incremen-tal global benefits result from additional activities 
added to a project for the achievement of emis-sion reductions. In a developing country success-ful interventions are likely to lead to increased emissions from the increased consumption of goods and services, but technology penetration will make for a cleaner future economy. While the baseline for large emitters is historical emissions, the baseline for developing countries is future emissions, which, when analysed through current methodologies, have inherent uncertainties that discourage the valuation of credits by potential investors. Given the political interest in renewable energy technologies, political leaders are likely to consider commitments to technology adoption as opposed to measured emissions.
Development Planning and climate changeThe national development and climate change planning processes need to be integrated. This calls for integration at the institutional level, where climate change focal points need to lean on the economic development ministries. Mech-anisms such as the GEF (Trust Fund, SCCF, LDCF etc), and CDM need to influence the mainstream 
Climate change issues are still treated as environmental issues with weak participation by the major players in economic development
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investment and development interventions di-rectly without building separate and parallel processes, as appears to be the case at present. Addressing climate change is now a mainstream economic issue, and national economic planning institutions need to take a leading role in imple-menting measures. The climate change structures need to be based on an economic planning focus with an inclusive investment structure and sector representation. It is otherwise difficult to identify the true incremental activities that need incen-tives to achieve the climate change mitigation objectives. Monitoring broader indicators such 
as average technology vintages and the growth of cleaner fuels in the energy sector would serve as simpler indicators of success in climate change mitigation. Current project-based methods tend to underestimate leakage where lower costs or substandard alternatives may exhibit stronger market growth. An example is compact fluorescent lamps, where the cheaper models with shorter life spans and lower energy efficiency tend to domi-nate the market. 
The GEF5 Strategy recognises the need to base interventions on national priorities, but lead-ership at the national level still comes from an environmental background without the required participation of development planners for strate-gic economic planning.
Southern Africa, like Africa in general, has failed to benefit from the resources made available for climate change mitigation due to the limited flows of investment finance into the continent. The bulk of the investment goes into infrastructure through public-sector channels where innovation is limited. Climate change finance would leverage higher incremental benefits if it were guided by explicit climate-sensitive policies and planners and designers with respective skills. Power utili-ties and project developers, amongst others, need to take leadership roles in implementing climate change interventions. These entities have experi-ence in dealing with venture capital and financ-ing institutions. Climate change finance would best be channelled through such routes, where relationships already exist and there are mecha-nisms for project monitoring and evaluation. Ex-perience so far has shown that a parallel climate change finance process faces prohibitive barriers in matching the pace and administrative process-es of mainstream investment finance. Projects originate out of the range of influence of climate change planners and only appear when technol-ogy and financing decisions have been made. If climate change mitigation planners are to catch investments early, they need to link up with finan-ciers, including venture capital and technology suppliers.
committing to cleaner DevelopmentCarbon intensity of production is directly relat-ed to production efficiency and competitiveness, hence it is a natural parameter for measuring con-tinuous improvement. NAMAs were proposed as a way to reduce the political differences related to the mechanisms existing before the Bali Action Plan. NAMAs seek to develop a more sustainable development baseline by avoiding poor technolo-gy ‘lock in’, especially in the infrastructure sectors. Since NAMAs are meant not to add to the invest-ment burden of developing countries, they are 
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best implemented as part of existing investment flows where additionality in terms of finance and emission avoidance can be measured. This implies the development of national strategies by identi-fying investment programs in both the public and private sectors and imbedding actions to reduce climate impacts within those programs. This is not to imply the absence of implementation barriers since any push on technology upgrading faces challenges in skills, finance and support services.
Regional governments are likely to prefer actions that involve direct poverty-reduction benefits. Most infrastructure investments have indirect poverty-reduction benefits as the target com-munities would need to raise additional finance to implement productive measures that benefit from the infrastructure investment. There is valu-able experience within the various development agencies operating in Africa that can be mobi-lised to achieve such investments. Stand-alone climate change funding has not been successful in finding partner investment finance in Africa. Opportunities have missed each other mostly due to low levels of awareness and coordination. The regional banks have an ongoing task to identify investment opportunities in both the private and public sectors. They are also in continuing dia-logue with the authorities. It would therefore be logical that climate change funds be channelled through these institutions where co-funding would originate in the form of low-cost finance. Needless to say, the administrative processes of climate change mitigation funding would have to match those of much higher volume co-funding.
measuring the benefitsThe high burden of new administrative proce-dures that have defined climate change mecha-nisms to date have served to create a new network of project development and management experts with a culture of combining UNFCCC modalities 
in technical project appraisal and viability anal-ysis. As a result of the poor integration of such skills in baseline project development, climate change interventions in Africa have appeared more as stand-alone actions, sometimes with poorly defined linkages to the baseline invest-ments. There is a need to close the cultural gap between the traditional investment agencies and the new climate change and development project experts by matching the project requirements and fusing the knowledge base. NAMAs would exhibit their intended benefits if linkages with baseline investments were closer and climate change ben-efits were accounted for side by side with the local project benefits. An example is if countries with natural gas resources like Mozambique and Tanza-nia chose to use the natural gas for electricity pro-duction instead of coal. The gas would therefore not be exported and the coal would remain in the ground. Given the absence of demand for heating, the natural gas would be used at low conversion efficiency, and the benefits of a coal industry that could help improve the local economy would also be lost. What appears as a plausible mitigation option may have inherent local losses that would, on the global level, justify the baseline as a better 
option for climate change mitigation and adap-tation. Historically climate change benefits have been reported separately, hence some poorly per-forming projects have carried what appeared to be good climate change benefits when measured alone. Biogas digesters for household use con-tinue to be considered a good mitigation option despite a very poor penetration and sustainability 
Regional governments are likely to prefer actions that involve direct poverty-reduction benefits
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profile over a long period of promotion. Rural bi-ogas digesters compete for water especially at in-itial filling and present technical challenges that are more than those experienced when searching for firewood, especially where wood is still availa-ble. Where wood is no longer available, livestock tends to be scarce as well.
Climate change is a permanent threat to develop-ment. There is no doubt that economic strength is a precondition for capacity to respond to climate change. As confirmed by the positions adopted at the COP since Marrakesh and Delhi, it is not pos-sible to separate climate change responses from sustainable development. Recent extreme weath-er experiences show that development cannot be called thus if it cannot stand up to or mitigate climate impacts. Africa should therefore adopt a strategic position in which action to mitigate climate change is imbedded in all development activities. At the implementation level there is a very small gap between climate change mitigation and adapting to climate change impacts. 
conclusions
1.  Southern Africa offers an opportunity to avoid future greenhouse gas emissions through the adoption of cleaner technologies as an integral part of development planning. If Southern Af-rica is to develop on the basis of cleaner tech-
nology, there need to be development targets that complement the objectives of global envi-ronment needs without necessarily expressing those targets in terms of greenhouse gas emis-sions. It is essential that the perceived conflict between the politics of global climate change mitigation not be viewed as an appropriate ref-erence point for addressing future greenhouse gas emissions where autonomous and future technology improvement may achieve such re-ductions.
2.  Climate change is an economic issue. The ear-ly part of the global debate has laid out the political and administrative framework. It is now important that implementation be shift-ed to the same forum as skills and resources for investment. The roles of the private sector and development banks need to be elevated together with the role of government financial and economic institutions. Key national eco-nomic sectors continually adopt strategies to sustain themselves against the threats of cli-mate change. These strategies and any global initiatives need to be integrated so as to im-prove efficiency and eliminate the perceived additional burden from global agreements.
3.  Sometimes separation of climate change mit-igation from climate change adaptation cre-ates an illusion for the allocation of resources and the evaluation of climate change benefits. The co-benefits of the two types of interven-tion need to be recognised as the bridge on which cleaner development commitments can be built. Projects tend to address both issues, and it would be more efficient if cases of global assistance were coordinated and evaluated to-gether so as to eliminate the current discreet mitigation and adaption criteria that make as-sistance like GEF complex and sometimes dif-ficult to access.
There is a need to close the cultural gap between the traditional investment agencies and the new climate change and development project experts by matching the project requirements and fusing the knowledge base
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4.  Analytical methods are recognised to be one of the barriers to African experience with cli-mate change mitigation. The application of uniform methods for large-scale projects with clear boundaries and small and diffuse projects mostly with future emissions serves to magnify the perceived risk that discourages investors. The emphasis on technology diffusion and the forecasting of future cleaner production would be a more appropriate approach for Africa.
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T his year’s Perspectives from UNEP and its UNEP Risø Centre in collaboration with the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) focuses on the elements of a new climate agreement by 2015 that will contribute to achieve the 2°C limit for global warming. The first paper frames the global mitigation challenge based on the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2012. The five other articles address key elements of a new climate agreement; emissions from international aviation, a vision for carbon markets up to 2020 and beyond, how green growth strategies can address the emissions gap, redesign of a REDD+ mechanism in response to the crisis of global deforestation and how NAMAs in Southern Africa can reconcile the gap between local and global objectives for development and climate change mitigation.  The Perspectives series seeks to inspire policy- and decision  makers by communicating the diverse insights and visions  of leading actors in the arena of low carbon development  in developing countries.
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